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Abstract: Youth citizenship is now on the international agenda. This paper explores what that concept 
might  mean  in  the  context  of  two  African  nations:  Kenya  and  Ghana.  Post  independence,  both 
countries focused on rethinking the colonial concept of citizenship in line with their political-cultural 
traditions, providing education for all youth and to encouraging new notions of national citizenship. 
Programmes for civic education were established that have been reshaped over the last fifty years. 
These  citizenship  education  programmes  display  the  tension  between  different  political  goals  of 
national unity,  economic progress and the promotion of human rights, working with diversity,  and 
encouraging collective responsibility and individual development. The aim is to use the education of 
the citizen to encourage civic engagement although there is evidence that these programmes might not, 
for a variety of reasons, engage all young people into the nation building project. The paper considers 
evidence from a wide range of documentary and social scientific sources to open debate about how to 
encourage young people’s citizenship within the project of poverty alleviation. 
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AFRICAN YOUTH: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
Somewhere between the years of early childhood and late adolescence, the apprentice 
citizen  is  expected  to  learn  the  skills  and  the  values  which  prepare  him  (sic)  for 
adulthood.  Few  societies  leave  the  instruction  of  their  youth  to  chance.  Schooling, 
whether formal and public in the usual sense of the term or informal and confined to the 
extended family, is as pervasive as it is relevant. (Prewitt 1971, p. xi) 
Nation-states construct young people as citizens in a variety of ways. The project of transmitting core 
values or ‘citizen virtues’ so as to unite members of a community runs parallel to and can influence the 
strategies used to transmit different knowledge and skills to different groups of children in preparation 
for economic life. Some educational systems prioritise national civic values and patriotism, some local 
cultures and traditions whilst others emphasise human rights, and the promotion of peace and stability 
through democratic governance. Often in the African context, all these traditions merge together when 
governments attempt to rework colonial heritages, to address more directly the conditions for national 
economic restructuring and growth within a global environment, and at the same time called to create 
a  form  of  civil  society  that  can  more  easily  address  social  inequalities.  Such  inequalities  both 
traditional and generated through colonial structures shape regional, rural-urban, ethnic, gender and 
age divisions. Emergent formal education therefore becomes the main vehicle for the inclusion of all 
youth in society, irrespective of these divisions and inequalities. It is used to create an inclusive civil 
society  that  supplements  the  legal  status  of  citizenship  by  embedding  a  range  of  new political, 
economic,  social  and  cultural  rights.  Much  of  this  task  used  to  fall  on  families,  and  other  local 
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institutions  such  as  clans,  chiefs  but  increasingly  social  change  and  urban  migration  reshapes 
household  and  family  structures.  The  long  term  future  stability  and  growth  of  a  nation  is  then 
dependent on the success of the educational system on unifying each new generation into a common 
project and giving them the cognitive and affective skills necessary to flourish and build a secure life. 
However,  the  tension between national,  ethnic  and economic demands  is  considerable  for 
African countries which have strong local  traditions and generationally organised cultures.  Young 
people have a number of responsibilities and duties in relation to the elders, their extended family and 
their  community.  Here  the  instruction  of  a  formal  school  system  can  create  a  breach  in  this 
relationship especially in so far as schooling prioritises individual advancement and achievement. The 
success  of  a  modern  laissez-faire  economy which is  dependent  upon mobile,  flexible  and  skilled 
workforce can jar with the traditions of collective responsibility, identity and cooperation as opposed 
to individual economic activity.   Whilst  educational policies highlight inclusion, human rights and 
citizenship,  the  gap  between  the  richer  elements  and  poorest  gets  greater  as  education  itself  is 
unequally distributed. The education of the citizen therefore is often the privilege of the educated, 
leaving  the  poor  without  access  to  the  knowledge  which  can  help  him  or  her  form appropriate 
relationships with social institutions and make their way in society. If these obstacles to citizenship 
can be identified, then perhaps we might  begin to understand the ways in which intergenerational 
transmission not just of property or poverty but also of citizenship status works. We can discover the 
critical  role  that  education  plays  in  shaping  the  differential  experiences  of  youth—the  impact  of 
schooling on those who manage to attend, but also those ‘out of school’ youth who, by definition, are 
excluded  from  the  state  national  citizenship  project  (even  if  they  are  included  in  local  civic 
communities). 
For many of those who are poor, the only means of survival is to sustain dependencies within 
local rural communities; for others, the attraction is to move to cities and towns and trying to find their 
own means of survival, and if successful, send monies home to help their communities. The tensions 
between promotion of the market and national cohesiveness within the shades of liberal democracy 
adopted in African nations such as Kenya and Ghana are complex and have major significance for the 
alleviation  of  poverty  in  developing  countries.  An  analysis  of  citizenship  agendas  in  these  two 
countries offers an opportunity to reflect how this interface between political and economic agendas 
affects  the  education  system and  its  outcomes  and  in  the  long  run,  the  implications  for  poverty 
alleviation. The more the formal education system is the vehicle for national unity,  the greater the 
marginalisation of those who are not schooled or who never reach secondary education where most 
effort is normally made to create civic identities and practices.
One of the first  tasks in our project  on  Youth,  Gender and Citizenship is  to establish the 
parameters  of  thinking  about  what  constitutes  the  national  goals  of  the  schooling  system,  how 
citizenship is constructed and what attempts have already been made to bring young people into active 
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participatory  forms  of  citizenship.  By  definition  therefore  we  begin,  not  with  a  narrow view  of 
defining education as preparation only for the market place. Poverty alleviation, as the World Bank 
Report (WDR, 2007) recently recognised cannot be achieved solely upon improving the transitions 
from schooling to work. The social-cultural, familial and political transitions in citizenship are equally 
important. Individuals will only find ways out of poverty if they feel that they belong, are valued and 
that they can make a contribution to society.
There are different ways to develop the capabilities of young people’s citizenship and their 
active levels of engagement and participation in a country (WDR, 2007). Formal schooling is the main 
way in  which the  majority  of  young  people  are  prepared for  adulthood—young  people  as  future 
citizens are entitled to an education. For those who attend school, there is the possibility in a modern 
economy of ‘becoming somebody’, a person with the potential to make their own way in the world, 
even if in the event they are not successful. Not surprisingly strong distinctions are made between the 
‘educated’ and the so-called ‘uneducated’ in Ghana and Kenya. Those who attend schools learn about 
the civic culture of a country by experiencing the structure, culture and organisation of the institution. 
However, the experience may also be contradictory. In some cases, this experience directly transmits 
the democratic and inclusive values intended by politicians and officials; in other cases, the experience 
contradicts those values, encouraging a discriminatory, negative view of the social order. Schools – 
unless closely monitored – are not unambiguously democratic institutions, hence the re-engagement 
continuously of  Ghanaian  and  Kenyan  policy makers  with  the  core  values  and  objectives  of  the 
education of young citizens.
A second way in which governments can assist in the inclusion of its ‘soon to be’ citizens is 
through the introduction of  specialised curriculum subject  on citizenship (variously named ethics, 
social studies or social science, civics/ citizenship education). This subject inevitably is associated 
with ambitious outcomes such as knowledge of the constitution, law, human rights, models of civic 
participation and the duties of a patriotic law abiding citizen etc. The aim here is directly to shape 
citizenship identities—alongside and sometimes counter to existing youth cultural and sub-cultural 
identities. National identity is critical to the integration of all young people in ethnically diverse and 
on occasion violent societies, but it has to compete with young people’s ethnic, gender, regional and 
local identities and responsibilities in generational, and community relations. The outcomes of such 
often small curricular initiatives are rarely assessed and there is no proof that they are successful in 
reducing social inequality and ensuring social integration. Nevertheless as the expression of national 
goals and cultures, these curricular initiatives have quite a political story to tell. 
The history of trying to establish, deliver and amend the education of young citizens and the 
education for citizenship is highly relevant. The objective for schooling offers an important indicator 
of  how  educational  outcomes  are  defined  politically,  and  establishes  a  yardstick  with  which  to 
compare those who have attended schooling and those who never have. We cannot understand the 
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contemporary  outcomes  of  the  formal  education  system  without  some  reference  to  this  history. 
Therefore, in this first of a series of YGC working papers, we focus on the stated aims and objectives 
for  education of  the  governments  of  first  Kenya  and then Ghana  in  approximately fifty  years  of 
independence. In both cases, early ambitious social goals were established for a national system of 
education  that  would  bring  together  the  next  generation  who  would  be  committed  to  building  a 
flourishing independent nation out of, and away from, its colonial past.  These founding ambitions for 
mass  education system provided a guiding thread through extraordinarily diverse  eras of  socialist 
governments, dictatorships, emergent democratic structures of governance to the present day. At the 
same time both Kenya and Ghana have moved their economies in line with neo-liberal ideals of free 
markets, privatised sector development, a reduced state, and a modernised workforce and skills. The 
move away from statism and from traditional economic activities has challenged the infrastructure not 
just  of  the  government  but  also  of  the  ability  of  educational  systems  to  deliver  economically 
employable youth especially at times of major restructuring and high youth unemployment. As this 
paper shows, what Bratton et al. (1999) call the ‘dual transition’ to democracy and a market based 
economy  in  ethnically  diverse  and  economically  unequal  societies  such  as  Ghana  and  Kenya  is 
challenging in the extreme. The school system is not only under pressure to expand and adjust its 
curriculum to new economic demands, but it was also expected to deliver democratic, human rights 
education and individual academic achievement releasing the entrepreneurial talents of its citizens, 
whilst, at the same time, not devaluing a country’s national identity and cultural heritage. 
The paper is divided into three sections. First we consider contrasting international agendas 
around educating for citizenship offered by a range of contemporary African social scientists. In the 
second and third sections we explore, first from a Kenyan and then from a Ghanaian perspective, the 
task of educating youth to engage with national goals and the strategies developed to achieve these 
goals.  The  diverse  nature  of  the  ‘civic  virtues’  which  are  encouraged in  the  young  immediately 
indicate just how much work has gone into establishing the education of its citizens as well as the 
considerable  difficulties  which  Kenya  and  Ghana  have  had  in  defining  their  own  versions  of 
citizenship, away from the pressures associated with the import of liberal democratic project and the 
construction of a neo-liberal state in the shape of post welfare European societies.  Citizenship goals 
for education were linked to poverty alleviation often only in an indirect way to notions of national 
economic  prosperity  through  notions  of  human  rights  and  ‘progress’  and  more  recently  to  the 
successful  implementation of the Millennium Development  Goals.  Poverty alleviation does not  of 
itself become a major citizenship goal in its own right, although latterly citizenship and poverty are 
more closely connected.
Youthful Africa: A ‘demographic window of opportunity’? 
The youth experience of citizenship is formative and has lasting effects on the extent and kind of 
political  participation throughout  life.  Citizenship affects  development  outcomes by enhancing the 
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human  and  social  capital  of  individual,  promoting  government  accountability  for  basic  service 
delivery and enhancing the overall climate for investment and private decision-making (WBR 2007, 
p.161). 
Today,  as the above quotation indicates,  the attention of the World Bank is  drawn to the 
experiences of youth as one of the main means to helping ensure economic development. The reality is 
that there is a record 1.3 billion youth aged between 12-24 in the world yet some 130 million cannot 
read  or  write.  In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  alone  some  200  million  of  the  population  (20%)  are  aged 
between 15 and 24. 1 This number will apparently peak in about 20 years. There is a chance now to 
invest in health, education and labour market skills, and to address the needs of this growing bulge of 
youth,  according  to  the  World  Bank report.  However  this  ‘demographic  window of  opportunity’ 
within which something can be done to prepare  these young people for  a globalised economy is 
closing fast. In a context where there is high illiteracy and HIV/AIDS, the challenge is massive. A 
high proportion of youth in Sub Saharan countries do not complete primary education, the quality of 
primary schools restricts  their  opportunities,  the costs  of  secondary education are unsustainable if 
expanded to cover the whole population, and its capacity insufficient to meet such a demand. The 
danger is that without sustained investment in such youth, they could become disaffected, alienated 
and be tempted by alternative life styles (such as, violence, drug cultures, terrorism). Group based 
social exclusion of youth is potentially dangerous to the political stability that is required for national 
economic growth. 
In this context, it is important to note the purposes for which the concept of ‘citizenship’ has 
been introduced into the development debate.2 It is noticeable that the World Bank now argues that 
educating for economic growth, although necessary, is not enough to remove poverty. Markets cannot 
deliver on their own; they need ‘collective action, public accountability, caring for kin and community 
environmental  stewardship’  (WDR 2007,  p.  160).  Attention  has,  therefore,  now turned  to  young 
people’s experiences of citizenship as ‘crucial for development outcomes’. The argument is that not 
only  governments  should  recognise  the  major  long  term  human  capital  consequences  of  young 
people’s  experiences  but  that,  as  a  consequence,  young  people  should now be seen as  important 
stakeholders. Without their active citizenry ‘collective action, public accountability, caring for kin and 
community, environmental stewardship, the promotion of human dignity, and the creation of shared 
identity and rights are so much more difficult ...’(WB, 2007, p.160) . The transition into ‘exercising 
citizenship’  is  described  as  one  of  five  key  transitions  of  youth  into  adulthood—the  others  are: 
learning; beginning to work; taking risks that impact on health; and forming families. 
1 See 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21997667~pageP
K:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html   Some 60% of the unemployed are youth aged 15-24 .  
2 Proponents of human rights have consistently argued about the need to establish liberal democratic structures 
and cultures if economic prosperity and national and individual well being is to be encouraged.
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The alternative as the World Bank Report points out is social exclusion, which lowers self-
perception and self-esteem. Without these, individuals would be unlikely to exercise ‘client power’ 
and leadership. Client power is understood as a form of empowerment that enables the consumer of 
any commodities, including education, to demand that their rights and legitimate interests are taken 
into account. Young active citizens within a neo-liberal framework can thus also be used to improve 
market  performance  and  capital  growth.  For  example,  young  people  as  stakeholders  can  protest 
against officials who are not accountable or inefficient. From this position it is possible to assess each 
national  scenario in  terms  of  the  achievement  of  an extensive and  comprehensive form of  youth 
citizenship in which young people feel that they not only have a shared identity, but also that they 
have  rights,  responsibilities  and  a  duty to  provide  some  service  to  society.  (World  Development 
Report 2007, Box 7.1, p.161). 
From an educational point of view, this new youth agenda highlights the value of a form of 
citizenship education for all  young people and a set  of  markers  with which to assess progress of 
schools towards the achievement of adult civic rights, responsibilities and duties. They would need to 
encourage  active  civic  engagement—youth  should  be  offered  practical  training  to  increase  their 
mobility in the informal sector.3 Schools should also ‘help young people make inroads and gain status 
in traditional  African society,  where governance in hierarchical  and vested in elders’  (p.  3).4 The 
development of social and human capital of individuals is recognised in this report as essential for 
private decision making. Thus, schools are encouraged to provide (a) opportunities for youth to learn 
how to practise and to actualise ‘active citizenship’; (b) they should help develop the capabilities of 
youth as part of the process of identity formation and recognition of the importance of youth identity 
by those who count; and (c) make sure that youth are given legally recognised second chances to 
correct mistakes, taking the wrong direction (e.g. drugs, violence, soldiering). 
Key to national development is the interest of youth in politics, the confidence of youth to 
engage in political realm and help solve community issues (p. 164). Social institutions such as schools 
can provide a space in which young people living in poverty feel they belong, and give them such 
confidence. Certainly as we shall later see, this is the view of both Ghanaian and Kenyan governments 
as they should to create an inclusive national  identity and to give young people civic knowledge 
whether through formal schooling, or informal out of school activities for youth. Unfortunately such 
civic education courses may not have an effective impact on young people. 
Youth are at the centre of a maelstrom of rapid and often destructive social change which 
distorts young people’s position within traditional gerontocratic communities and can cut them off 
3 The World Bank Report (2007) quotes Kenya’s Jua Kali program which enhanced master craftsmen’s access to 
new technologies and skills, improving training of apprentices.
4 The Report refers to civil organisations such as Kafoolu in West Africa which gave young people opportunities 
to participate. 
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from sources of survival. Youth,5 particularly those living in poverty or near the poverty line, are at the 
centre of a whole range of global and local social transformations. In his introductory remarks on 
youth in a Special Issue of Africa Today, Burgess (2005) argues that young Africans are influenced in 
diverse ways by a range of competing economic, political and social forces. He lists the following:
(a)  Globalisation,  urbanisation,  the  growth  of  reflexive  individualisation,  reflexivity,  the 
impact of global mass media; 
(b) The increase in rural/urban poverty, growing gaps between rich and poor, the movement to 
cities; 
(c)  The cultural  heritage and identity of  a nation and its  calls  for  patriotism and political 
allegiance;
(d) Young people’s own reaction to traditional ethnic, patriarchal, gerontocratic and gender 
cultures. (Burgess, 2005a, p.xxi)
Rather  than  being  the  new  stakeholders  of  market-led  economies  and  promoters  democratic 
governance, youth are caught between becoming postmodern Westernised ‘vanguards’ or violent and 
disengaged ‘vandals’ (Abbink and van Kessel, 2005). Social scientists and historians have mapped in 
various  case  studies,  the  destructive  effects  of  globalisation  and  neo-liberal  reform on traditional 
communities which were shaped by generational structures that gave young people their civic duties 
and responsibilities. As Mamdani (1996) commented, one should not ignore the duality of citizenship 
in  African  societies.  Young  people  held  the  status  of  ‘subjects’  within  these  ethnically  based 
communities and ‘citizens’ in relation to the state.  The more the latter is emphasised over the former, 
the less support there is for young people, especially in countries which cannot fund state welfare 
systems. 
In  this  context,  researchers  exploring  ‘youthful  Africa  in  the  21st century’6 highlight  the 
‘deagrarianisation’ of rural Africa,7 which has meant that young people have had to cope with the 
social disruption of leaving rural communities as they enter adulthood, with little social support or 
social capital. Urbanisation has led to young migrants and refugees coming to the city, moving into the 
informal  employment  sector.  Youth  can  find  themselves  occupying  a  ‘transient  position’  within 
particularly traditional rural settings, and within urbanised political structures of the state (Burgess, 
2005a, p. xxi). Paradoxically,  the resulting ‘autonomy,  shiftlessness, individuality and materialism’ 
amongst young people may then be understood not as a contribution to economic growth, but as a 
5 By focusing  on  youth,  as  Burgess  (2005a)  points  out,  we  are  reminded  of  the  significance  of  familial, 
generational and communal structures which in the African contexts have been severely disrupted by processes 
of westernisation and individuation as well as noted by the demographic shifts of migrations to urban centres. 
These phenomena have tended to influence generational relations in negative ways that problematise forms of 
authority that can, therefore, of themselves become the focus of youth resistance. 
6 The Africa Studies Association 46th Annual Conference Boston, in 2003. 
7 Christopher Barrett, ‘Agriculture, food security and rural development’–thematic statement for the Youthful 
Africa in the 21st Century Conference.
8
threat to the social stability necessary for economic progress and social cohesion. Because of this, 
unemployed  school  leavers  and  dropouts  have  been  attracted  to  protest  movements,  political 
organisations that are potentially violent, military and nationalist movements and drug cultures. At the 
same time they are faced with dangerous health scenarios (not least that of HIV/AIDS) in a context 
where economic reforms have led to a reduction in state activity and welfare support. Finally, we also 
have to recognised that  formal  educational  institutions modern Western cultures encourage young 
people  to  move  away from traditional  cultural  sources  and  identities,  so  for  example  they  raise 
expectations that girls might change their status in the community,  within the domestic sphere and 
gender relations. 
Therefore, economic restructuring and political reformations in the postcolonial era have very 
uneven and often unexpected impacts on different groups of youth. New groups of young citizens 
emerge  whose  specific  types  of  poverty,  educational  paths  and  sense  of  political  belonging  and 
‘becoming’ reflect the tensions between modernisation and traditional community identifications (c.f. 
Burgess, 2005a). The dilemma for many African countries undergoing rapid change is whether young 
people can successfully connect to and feel that they belong not just to fluid shifting markets but also 
to the national definitions of citizenship and citizenship responsibilities.  Given the levels of youth 
poverty, unemployment and disconnection, Abbink argues that, on the whole: ‘To be young in Africa 
[has come] to mean being disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginal in the political and economic sense’ 
(Abbink, 2005, p.7). Rather than holding their future in their own hands, they are relatively powerless 
citizens.
Whilst there has been progress in some respects—for example, in education, migration and 
job opportunities in the urban area—the exponential population increase and fierce competition for 
resources within the contexts of malfunctioning or failing states have led to a relative decline in the 
well being and social advancement of young people in Africa. They are growing up in conditions of 
mass unemployment and are facing exclusion, health problems, crisis within the family due to poverty, 
and the Aids pandemic, and a lack of education and skills. They also are marginalised in national state 
policies  and  have  a  weak  legal  position.  African  youths  are  over-represented  in  armed  rebel  or 
insurgent movements of various kinds as well as in criminal activities (Abbink and Van Kessel, 2005, 
p. 1) 
Young  people’s  lives  are  often  affected  by so-called  ‘faulty  modernisation’  (Abbink  and 
Kessel, 2005) make the point that that they are not necessarily growing up in relatively well integrated 
societies, but in ‘impoverished and internally divided wholes’ (p. 2). They do not have a well defined 
place  in  a  shifting  society.  Yet  the  same  time,  despite  this  bleak  Hobbesian  scenario,  it  is  also 
important to remember that young people are exceptional in their ability to survive such social change. 
They are active agents on all  fronts,  even if their presence is not recognised. They hold to moral 
expectations about the value of politics, the need to challenge corruption, to deliver what is right and 
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to their  entitlements.  In that  sense youth people in Africa are engaging in citizenship,  even if  on 
occasion this involves working through violent or subversive organisations. In that sense they are both 
‘vanguards’ and ‘vandals’ (Abbink and Van Kessell, 2005). Education is seen to be of great value by 
African  youth  not  least  because  it  is  seen  as  a  way out  of  poverty,  into  employment,  and  even 
emigration. It is a means of social mobility (Abbink and Kessel, 2005, p.7). 
From the perspective of youth, there is therefore a strained relationship between economic 
growth and citizenship not least because the former, in its neo-liberal forms, has created the conditions 
for their ‘powerlessness’ (O’Brien 1996) and has been responsible, some argue, for the destruction of 
traditional cultures and well being and the generational relations that supported young people. Young 
people as a result of such reforms cannot establish their own independent households (O’ Brien, 1996, 
p. 57), with all sorts of consequences for family life, the raising of children, and for law and order. 
Also since the 1970s, African youth tend to have little in common with their parents—take up several 
different  options whether as victims or heroes,  criminals or entrepreneurs,  They are only partially 
educated, have material expectations that they cannot fulfil. As a result, as O’ Brien argues, it is no 
longer possible to take the process of ‘becoming somebody’ for granted any longer (p. 58). Further the 
gap between the elite educated and those who cannot go to school or who drop out is becoming that 
much greater. 
It is in this context that we begin our analysis of the problem of youth and the problem for 
youth in the countries of Kenya and Ghana, respectively. The educational policies, which intend to 
foster the inclusion and engagement of all young citizens, are our starting point. At this preliminary 
stage, we have garnered what we can from documents, speeches, academic research, and evidence 
from interviews with officials and from other social researchers about the ways in which citizenship is 
understood in Ghana and Kenya.8 The two histories of citizenship and citizenship education in these 
countries  suggest  the  ways  in  which  the  respective  political  leadership  has  steered  the  formal 
education  system  to  include  all  students  in  a  nation-building  project  and,  on  occasion,  address 
concerns about social inequality, law and order, and on occasion a perception of the growing ‘moral 
decadence’ of its youth. Interestingly the parallel development of government departments working on 
youth  policy and NGOs initiatives to develop active citizenship amongst  youth especially ‘out  of 
school’ youth and the need to find new ways of including all young people, particularly the most 
disadvantaged in the shaping of future developments.9
8 This analysis does not include all those historical and contemporary youth programmes aimed at promoting 
citizenship (see for example, Burgess’ analysis of Youth Pioneers in Zanzibar) or student political movements. 
9 This is the same kind of faith fostered, on the role of education in preparing the youth for participation in 
citizenship that is expressed by Prewitt (1971: ix) when he states that: 
Passage rites, induction ceremonies, youth societies, and public schools, are among the institutions 
charged to prepare the youth for adulthood. Instruction is of two general types: (1) there are lessons in 
the technology and skills of social life-in reading, food gathering techniques, in weapons and fighting, 
or whatever technical skills are seen as pertinent to social survival. (2) There are lessons in the norms 
and regulations of social  life.   The same schooling agencies,  which instruct the child in technical 
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EDUCATING YOUTH FOR CITIZENSHIP IN KENYA 
Post-independent Kenya as a sovereign state is a country whose political and social life claims to be 
founded on democratic principles. Kenya has put in a spirited effort to prepare its youth for a type of 
citizenship that allows its men and women to live comfortably and serve in some kind of a democratic 
society.  In  a democracy,  there is  often the tension between,  on the  one hand,  individual-oriented 
values and the social-oriented values and between material and non-material oriented values on the 
other—values,  which are  assumed to  be appropriate  for  an ideal  citizen.  Kenya,  like  many other 
countries, uses education as a means of inculcating the democratic attributes of democratic life in its 
youth.10 
The challenge for the first independent Kenyan government was to guide a country composed 
of  various  ethnic  groups  with  different  cultures  into  a  new  nation.  One  and  a  half  years  after 
independence, Kenya made a strong attempt to articulate its national philosophy in the form of the 
Sessional Paper No.10: African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (GoK, 1964). 
Outlined here were a range of general national goals (general enough to be adaptable to any society): 
political equality, social justice, human dignity including freedom of conscience, freedom from want, 
disease and exploitation,  equal  opportunities and high and growing  per capita incomes,  equitably 
distributed. 
As an emerging new nation, Kenya was at pains to avoid aligning herself directly with, on one 
hand, Western liberal ideologies or socialist ideologies on the other,  preferring to adopt what was 
referred  to  as  democratic  African  socialism  (GoK,  1964,  p.2).  The  two  principles  underlying 
democratic African socialism were  political democracy and  mutual social responsibility. These two 
principles were expected to become the pillars of the Kenya national educational system, with only a 
few modifications from time to time in order to accommodate new realities. However, over the last 
forty years, what should constitute young Kenyan’s civic identities and their rights and responsibilities 
as citizens have been subject to much debate and government work. Over time, educational policies, 
curricula and practices have been designed to bring young people within the framework of changing 
Kenyan civic and social values and reforms of the economy.
African Socialism and Ubuntu: forging a different path
After  gaining independence in early 1960s,  the  Kenyan  government  immediately started work on 
establishing an educational system for its youth that reflected the aspirations of the new nation. A 
commission was set up to survey and evaluate the then existing British colonial education system 
(which still had many of the racial and religious features associated with colonialism) and to advise the 
skills, also teach him the cultural norms and expectations associated with membership of society.
10 In both the Kenyan Constitution (GoK, 1969, Chapter VI) and Draft Constitution (GoK, 2005, Chapter IV), 
citizenship is defined in the formal and legalistic sense where basically a person qualifies to become a Kenyan 
citizen by birth, registration or naturalization
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government on appropriate educational reforms. What became known as the Ominde Commission’s 
Report on Education (GoK, 1964) recommended that a re-structured system of education should focus 
on several broad objectives such as the fostering of a sense of nationhood, the promotion of national 
unity,  social  equality,  social  obligation  and  responsibility,  and  at  the  same  time  the  removal  of 
divisions based on race, tribe and/or religion. To inculcate these egalitarian social values, the Ominde 
Commission  suggested several  strategies  that  included encouraging primary school  teachers  to  be 
creative and progressive by encouraging their pupils to think and act like Kenyans—that is, construct 
Kenyan  identities.  Other  unifying  recommendations  involved  teaching  all  young  Kenyans  in  a 
common language (such as English) and the suggestion that students from different geographical and 
cultural backgrounds would be brought together in national boarding schools so as to learn under one 
roof  (GoK,  1964,  p.28-29).  By  accepting  and  implementing  these  recommendations,  the  formal 
education system was charged with the responsibility of developing the entitlement of all  Kenyan 
youth to schooling and citizenship identities that overrode ethnic and social divisions. 
Providing young people with a suitable form of citizen education guided many reforms in later 
decades.  In  the  1970s,  for  example,  only  a  decade  after  the  Ominde  Report  on  Education,  the 
government again reviewed the education system through the National  Committee  on Educational 
Objectives and Policies (NCEOP). NCEOP was established under the chairmanship of Peter Gachathi, 
then Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Education (GoK, 1976). The Committee’s brief was to 
focus on two key issues. The first related to the realization that educational provision was becoming 
very expensive for the government yet young people coming out from the education system were not 
obtaining gainful employment—even though education was generally perceived as the best guarantee 
for both personal as well  as social advancement.  Secondly,  there was a perceived societal need to 
redefine Kenyan social and ethical values not least because public condemnation of social problems 
such as  ‘corruption,  nepotism,  tribalism and idleness…’ were  seen to  be  ineffective.  These were 
maladies usually associated with lack of the necessary supporting moral and civics education (GoK, 
1976,  p.7-8).  Faith  in  the  importance  of  educating  youth,  as  a  means  of  economic  and  social 
development,  remained  strong  despite  the  rather  high  levels  of  poverty  (GoK,  2003)  and  such 
perceived moral decadence. One of the basic assumptions was that the government had the obligation 
to continue using education for the promotion of national unity,  to eradicate social,  economic and 
regional inequalities, in order to develop those being educated into useful citizens, capable of, and 
motivated towards the improvement of the nation as a whole. Arguably such moral approaches would 
also help economic growth as well as individual development. The Gachathi Report (GoK, 1976, p. 7) 
offered the following argument: A business that has no in-built financial control cannot survive in the 
long run. But financial control is a human activity based on the knowledge, skills and moral education 
of the individual involved. Thus, without any kind of moral belief and education, the individual may 
just  be  happy to  manipulate  the  financial  figures  for  selfish reasons,  and to  the  detriment  of  the 
business concern (GoK, 1976: Ibid).
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Another way of dealing with the anti-social behaviour was developing at the time amongst 
Kenyan  youth11 was  to  introduce  into  formal  education  a  new  separate  school  subject  Social  
Education and Ethics.12 The justification for the teaching of ethics is captured well in the following 
statement:  ‘…lack of ethical foundations will constitute a basis for social disintegration and in the 
long run, degeneration of quality of life of society and eventual social death (GoK, 1976, p.7). Social 
Education and Ethics  (SEE) was established as  a secondary school  subject  within the  new 8-4-4 
system of education, introduced in 1986. Unfortunately the new subject was optional. Further, it never 
became part of the curriculum at the higher education level. This is perhaps one of the indications that, 
the institutions  of  higher  learning have never  been serious champions for  the  inculcation of non-
economic values likely to promote citizenship in the youth. 
A shift in emphasis by the late 1980s placed this education in social ethics alongside new 
economic emphases on self-reliance and self-employment  (a shift  that again reflected the growing 
unemployment of youth). In 1988, a new general review of Kenyan educational philosophy, policies 
and objectives was set up to consider whether these were in line with the changing socio-cultural, 
economic and political demands of the country. A Presidential Working Party under the Chairmanship 
of James M. Kamunge13 was established to look into Education and Manpower Training for the Next  
Decade and Beyond (GoK, 1988). This review recommended that the concepts and practices of co-
operative effort and mutual social responsibility offered in Social Education and Ethics in secondary 
schools, be taught and developed in all levels of education and training (GoK, 1988). 
The inculcation of values of citizenship and the development of young Kenyans’ capabilities 
as citizens reflected the tension between collective social responsibility and individual achievement 
and responsibilities—themes that were reworked in the late 1990s. In preparation for the 21st Century 
and  the  3rd  Millennium,  the  Government  appointed  a  Commission  of  Inquiry into the  Education 
System of Kenya that was chaired by David Koech (GoK, 1999a). The task was to review Kenya’s 
educational system and recommend ways and means of enabling the government to facilitate the link 
between  national  unity,  mutual  social  responsibility,  accelerated  industrial  and  technological 
development, and consolidation and enhancement of life-long learning (GoK, 1999a: xix).
The Koech Commission underscored the need for Kenya to produce, through the education 
system, a new type of citizenry that would have the following characteristics: a sense of patriotism and 
nationalism that transcends ethnic and traditional ties, integrity of character, and a vision to uphold the 
11 The recommendation to introduce Social Education and Ethics in the education system was not implemented 
until 1986 when it became part of Secondary Education.
12 Five years  after  the Gachathi  report,  another  commission was appointed under the chairmanship of  C.B. 
Mackay, a Canadian educationalist. The Mackay Report (GoK 1981) argued for the contribution that education 
could make to economic development, but at the same time it should contribute to the promotion of social justice 
and inculcate social ethics in youth. Despite the fact that the core mandate the Mackay Report was to investigate 
the possibility of launching a second public university,  its recommendations reiterated the importance of the 
general education objectives identified in the earlier education commission documents.
13 The then Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education
13
rule of law (GoK, 1999a, p. 17). It emphasised communal civic virtues which individuals share, such 
as moral virtues of honesty, confidence, work ethics and concern for others’ welfare. It also identified 
several specific school subjects such as Social Education and Ethics, Religious Education, Literature, 
and History and Government, all of which have the potential to inculcate these values in youth and all 
of which were already established in the school curriculum.14 
Educating youth for citizenship in secondary schools 
The development of Social Education and Ethics (SEE) had a strong egalitarian thrust even though it 
was placed in secondary schools as an optional subject along with religious and business education. 
Compared with the latter, SEE was perceived by many parents as being relatively less valuable (See 
KIE, 1999) and hence, most schools lobbied to have it expunged from the curriculum as a way of 
trimming the number of subjects being offered in secondary school. 
The Mackay report emphasised that a national education system should always aim to remove 
social injustice and disparities between sexes, geographical regions and social and economic groups in 
a community (GoK, 1988, p.10). Secondary Education forms the third cycle of education in Kenya, 
after Pre-Primary and Primary Education. In reality Secondary Education is the second cycle since 
Pre-Primary Education has yet to be fully embraced by the Government as part of public education 
system. African societies recognize this stage and attach a lot of importance to it as the period when 
the youth are prepared for the responsibilities of becoming adults (GoK, 1988). In practice, there has 
been  a  tendency to  stress  what  is  expected  of  the  youth  in  terms  of  academic  performance  and 
patriotism  over  their  entitlement  to  relevant  education  commensurate  to  behavioural  change  that 
reflects  nationhood  and  belonging.  This  notwithstanding,  the  general  objectives  of  the  four  year 
Secondary Education for the mostly 14-17 year cohorts as formulated by the Presidential Working 
Party in the late 1980s are to: 
• provide for an all round mental, moral and spiritual development;
• provide relevant skills towards positive contribution to the development of society;
14 While the cultivation of social values in support of citizenship is readily acknowledged in Kenyan primary and 
secondary  schools,  this  is  not  obviously  the  case  at  post-secondary  institutions.  A  Task  Force  on  Higher 
Education and Society was set up and convened jointly by the World Bank and UNESCO. The Task Force 
explored  the  future  role  of  higher  education  in  the  developing  world  In  the  Task  Force’s  Report  Higher 
Education  in  Developing  Countries:  Peril  and  Promise,  ((International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and 
Development/World  Bank,  2000).  Several  issues  relating  to  citizenship  were  addressed.  In  the  chapter  on 
“Higher Education and Public Interest”, for example, there is a section on ‘Higher Education and Democratic 
Values’. Here the Report argues that a society that wishes to build or maintain a pluralistic and accountable 
democracy needs higher  education for  at  least  two reasons;  first,  creating a forum where people attempt to 
understand the form of governance or political democracy that is suitable for particular societies. This could be 
done by use of debates and research projects on social issues. Second, higher education could help in promoting 
enlightened citizens by inculcating in them norms and attitudes that are crucial to democratic life in, and when 
out of school. Thus, while higher education is important for economic development, it was argued that it also 
had the potential to yield non-economic benefits  that were crucial  for  a democratic life.  This called for the 
restoration of the humanities and social sciences on the curricula of institutions of higher learning, (ibid., p. 44). 
The Task Force underlined the same sentiments; that  general  education can promote responsible citizenship 
through the development of ethical behaviour (World Bank 2000: 88). 
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• ensure balanced development in cognitive (knowledge), psychomotor (manipulative and practical) 
and affective (attitude and value) skills;
• lay a firm foundation for further education, training and work; and,
• lead to the acquisition of positive attitudes and values towards the well-being of society (GoK, 
1988, p.27).
To address the above objectives, the following subjects* were offered to the students:
Table 1: The Secondary School Curriculum
 (A) Compulsory Subjects 
*English
*Kiswahili
Mathematics
Biological Sciences
Physical Sciences
*Geography
*History and Government
*Religious Education
Agriculture
(B)  Applied  Subjects—to 
choose one
Woodwork
Power Mechanics
Electricity
Building Construction
Drawing and Design
Home Science
(C)  Artistic  and  Other 
Subjects—to choose one 
Music
Art and Design
Business Education
Foreign Languages
*(D) Social Education and 
Ethics
(E) Physical Education
Source: GoK (1988)
*School  subjects  that  are  supposed  to  be  ‘carriers’  of  social  values  relevant  to  young  people’s  civic 
education.  Each student offered 13 subjects in Form 1 and 2. In Form 3 and 4 each student was to take 
examination in 10 subjects, which would include Mathematics, English, Kiswahili, 2 Sciences, Geography, 
and History and Government.
While most of the subjects offered in Secondary School Education could be assumed to contribute to 
developing youth citizenship in one way or other, it is those subjects that are indicated with an asterisk 
which  are  expected  to  play a  relatively larger  role.  Depending on how they are  presented,  these 
subjects have the potential to assist individuals to develop the norms and values that would guide them 
to become members of the collective (Prewitt, 1971, p. vii). 
*
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Of key concern here is the devaluation of Social Education and Ethics, which was no longer 
compulsory in Form 1 and 2, and the making of Religious Education and Social Education and Ethics 
optional among 10 Subjects in which only one Subject was to be taken in Forms 3 and 4. The other 
options within this group were; Geography, History and Government, Fasihi kwa Kiswahili, Literature 
in  English  Foreign  languages  and  Sign  Language.  A student  could  decide  to  take  none  of  these 
Subjects  for  the  KCSE.  Finally,  Geography  and  History  and  Government,  Subjects  that  were 
perennially at  the core of  Secondary School  Curriculum and which provided basis  for  citizenship 
education became options15. The reason for this decision was that a Needs Assessment Survey Report 
on the Secondary Education Curriculum of 1999,16 recommended that Social Education and Ethics be 
dropped  from  the  Secondary  School  Curriculum  and  instead  be  taught  through  other  subjects 
identified as ‘carrier  subjects’.  This recommendation drew upon the survey findings showing that 
stakeholders rated the subject17 as the ‘least useful’ (KIE, 1999: 40).18 In 2003, the subject was finally 
dropped from the curriculum.19 While the Needs Assessment Team rated SEE as the ‘least useful’ 
probably based on the perception of its low potential in accessing youth to the labour market, it is 
arguable  that  SEE has relatively greater  potential  in  terms  of  the  ethics  needed for  greater  social 
cohesion and the harnessing the growth of a young economy that is free of economic and political 
corruption but strong on social responsibility. 
It is important to note that besides the use of formal classroom teaching of social values, there 
are  other  activities,  which are  expected  to  assist  youth  with  social  bonding while  at  school.  The 
activities include sports meetings, District, Provincial and National Music Drama festivals. Further, 
the observance and recognition of national Days such as Jamhuri (Independence) Day and Kenyatta 
Day (representing Hero’s Day), the national Anthem and the National Flag are all supposed to inject 
national cohesiveness in the youth as members of a Kenyan community. In this regard, flag hoisting, 
reciting the Loyalty Pledge to the State and the singing of the National Anthem have been religiously 
carried out every Mondays and Fridays in all the schools (GoK, 1999). Finally, the use of English (as 
15 The Secondary School Curriculum had few changes between the Kamunge Report GoK, 1988) and Koech 
Report (GoK, 1999), key of which were: 1) addition of Computer Studies and, 2) the reduction of the number of 
each student had to take in the KCSE from 10 to 8. Among other notable changes in the Koech Report that are 
relevant to this paper, were the separation of the English paper into English Language and Literature in English, 
and Kiswahili into Lugha ya Kswahili and Fasihi kwa Kiswahili.
16 Kenya Institute of Education (a government agency in charge of Basic Education Curricula)
17 Presumably, most of the stakeholders in this reference my have constructed the value of school subjects in the 
context  of  economic outcomes  per se, a  perception which these the authors  of  this  paper  have  challenged. 
Without well-defined values  and ethical  foundations,  humanity tends to  loose its  sense  of community as  it 
pursues the dimension of material wealth. 
18 In the same Report, the following 9 Subjects were rated as the most relevant in terms of meeting the needs of 
both  the  learners  and  the  society  at  large.  These  are:  English  Language,  Mathematics,  Kiswahili,  Biology, 
Geography, Physics, Chemistry, History and Government, and Religious Education (KIE, 1999: x).
19 It is important to note that, although students recommended the dropping of Religious Education from the 
Secondary School Curriculum, the subject was retained due to the support given by the parents who participated 
in the KIE survey. 
16
medium of instruction) and Kiswahili as common languages as opposed to the vernacular languages is 
supposed to enhance social integration among students from various cultural groups.
Promoting Education for All
In recent years, the emphasis has shifted away from the curriculum towards promoting ‘education for 
all’. The Kenyan government has made considerable efforts to deliver to its young citizens their rights 
to an education. The most recent and apparently most bold of these attempts was in 2003 when Free 
Primary Education (FPE) was re-introduced. The FPE raised enrolment rates from 5,874,776 in year 
2002 to 6,906,355 in 2003, an increase of some 17.6%. This increase affected both boys and girls 
although the increase in girls’ enrolment in primary education was 16%, which was three percentage 
points lower than that of the boys at 19% (MoE, 2008). The Gender Enrolment Rate (GER) in 2006 
for boys had risen by approximately 5 points, from 27.2 to 32.0 compared to that of boys,  which 
increased by 6.8 points, from 24.2 to 30.0. Nationally the boys GER was higher than that of the girls 
by nearly two points. However, available gender disaggregated data shows that there were notable 
regional gender disparities which show that Gender Parity Index (GPI) was lowest in North Eastern 
Province while Nairobi, Central, Eastern and Nyanza had near gender parity. 
 Table 2: The Gender Parity Index (GPI) by Province, 2000-2005
Province 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Coast 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.98
Central 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.01 1.00 0.99
Eastern 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.99
Nairobi 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.04
Rift Valley 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97
Western 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95
Nyanza 1.00 0.98 1.01 0.99 0.99 0.99
North Eastern 0.57 0.60 0.72 0.62 0.63 0.71
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.02 0.99 1.00 0.99
Source: Statistics Section, MoE, 2008
There was still  however a too high percentage of children who would not  attend primary 
school  despite  being free.  In  2008,  the  Government  went  further  and introduced  Free Secondary 
Education (FSE), which relieved families of tuition fees as well as having to buy teaching and learning 
materials. However parents and guardians still had to take responsibility for paying for other school 
related costs, such as boarding, feeding and their children’s school uniform. The FSE policy has in 
effect made day schools affordable to the majority of households that are relatively poor. The long-
term plan is to make secondary education completely free and preferably compulsory as part of basic 
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education as is the case in other countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom. The tuition fee 
waiver  for  secondary  education  has  popular support  from  parents,  guardians,  students  and 
communities in general. As a demonstration of its commitment to providing free secondary education, 
the Government  has in retrospect undertaken to write off  all  debts owed to secondary schools by 
graduates of previous years whose certificates had been withheld owing to their debts. 
The  drive  to  ensure  the  entitlement  of  all  its  citizens  to  education  also  led  to  a  major 
development in Kenyan public universities Year 2001. The government introduced a new policy that 
encouraged  the  admission  of  privately  sponsored  students  to  learn  alongside  the  Governments 
sponsored  ones.  This  relatively  new approach  to  expanding  of  university  education  is  popularly 
referred to as Module II, Parallel Programs, and Self Sponsored Programmes (SSPs) among others. All 
public  universities  have  now  adopted  this  approach  which  has  helped  increase  access  to  higher 
education while at the same time,  enabling universities to subsidise government capitation. Public 
universities enrolled in the scheme in 2000/2001, and by 2004/2005, the seven public universities had 
81,491 students, compared with the 10,050 students in private universities—a growth rate of 60.7% at 
an average rate of 12.6% per annum. The gender patterns described in Table 3 below show a marked 
improvement in the number of female and male students although there is still considerable gender 
disparity. 
Table 3: Growth in enrolment in public universities by gender
Gender Male Female Total
2000/2001 33,445 17,259 50,704
2004/2005 53,394 28,097 81,491
Growth rate 2000/01 to 20004/05 12.4% p.a. 12.9% p.a. 12.6% p.a.
Source MoE 2006 (Education Statistical Booklet)  and 2007 (Economic Survey) 
Evaluating the outcomes
From the policies and practices outlined above, it is legitimate to ask whether there is any evidence 
that the Kenya government has achieved her social goals regarding youth citizenship. In a word, have 
these  educational  initiatives  and strategies helped Kenyan  youth  to  develop their  potential  and to 
identify themselves as Kenyan citizens? Is there any evidence that the reforms of the access to, the 
structure and content of the Kenyan educational system which have been designed to be inclusive, 
have succeeded in uniting youth in the nation-building project?
What has been demonstrated so far is the fact that Kenya government has tried to design an 
educational system for all its citizens. It has worked to reshape the colonial legacies of hierarchy and 
inequality, to redistribute education to all, to provide a common curriculum that included the teaching 
of civic values and national ethics. Since independence, only a few minor changes have been made to 
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the  structure  of  the  schooling  system.  In  general,  curriculum  planning  has  emphasised  the 
development  of  two types  of  abilities  and values,  which were  to  be  promoted.  Firstly,  schooling 
should  develop  young  people’s  skills  that  would  allow them to  satisfy their  basic  needs  as  they 
graduate into adulthood, especially the ability to provide food, health and shelter for themselves. The 
spill-over benefits from such individual activities were expected to bring about national economic 
development. As King put in a policy review:
Our assumptions,  throughout this  review of Kenya’s  policy literature,  has been either that 
there is, or that policy makers would like there to be, a close relationship between education 
and  training,  on  one  hand,  and  national  development,  employment,  industrialisation,  or 
agricultural and entrepreneurship development, on the other. (King, 2006, p.47). 
What  is  not  clear  is  whether the education encouraged the sort  of  learning that  could help youth 
develop  skills  and  vocational  and  entrepreneurial  values  that  would  enable  them  to  become 
economically independent,  consequently reduce their  own poverty making  them feel  they have a 
reasonably equal share in the resources of their country.20 
The second general objective of Kenyan schooling is to help develop abilities and values that 
would allow all young people become proud and useful members of the society—that is, citizens. As 
we  have  seen,  several  school  subjects  were  identified  as  having  the  potential  to  inculcate  these 
important abilities and values in the youth. School subjects in the general areas of humanities and 
social sciences such as History and Government, Geography Religious Education, English Language, 
Literature in English, Lugha ya Kiswahili (Kiswahili Language), Fasihi kwa Kiswahili (Literature in 
Kiswahili  Language) and Social Education and Ethics were identified as vehicles to champion the 
development of the norms and values that are essential for Kenyan youth. 
Although policy makers trusted the formal school curriculum to inculcate appropriate values 
to young people, some doubts have appeared as to their efficacy.  For instance, in reference to the 
teaching of Social Education and Ethics, the Gachathi Committee expressed concern that some schools 
tended  to  over-emphasise  the  cognitive  aspect  of  education  at  the  expense  of  the  affective  and 
practical aspects, which relate to the development of desirable character and values (GoK, 1988, p.14). 
A related weakness is the tendency for the school system to put too much emphasis on the passing of 
examinations at the expense of acquiring skills, knowledge, attitudes and expertise that are necessary 
for national development (KIE, 1999, p. 24). Research also seems to suggest that civic education has a 
weak effect on school age children—perhaps because it is not examined nationally. A case in point: 
An  out  of  school  civic  education  project  in  Zambia  changed  the  knowledge  dimension  of  the 
participants rather than their behaviour (World Development Report 2007, p. 174). Knowledge that is 
20 Household surveys carried out in Rwanda (Household Living Conditions Survey of 2001 and Core Welfare 
Indicators Questionnaire of 2003) where it was shown that of the data collected, 51% of the households where 
the head of the household had some education were still economically poor and that 38.2% of those classified as 
illiterate were ‘not poor’ (Hayman, 2005, p. 39). 
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devoid of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ seems to have had little impact on young people’s active citizenship. It 
is  unclear whether those charged with designing the curriculum for citizenship are themselves well 
equipped with the cognitive, attitudinal and practical knowledge about citizenship. It is one thing to 
‘talk about’ citizenship or urge people to act as true citizens and quite another thing to role model for 
young people  how exactly they can practise  true  citizenship whereby they enjoy their  rights  and 
execute their responsibilities as Kenyans. 
On another front, Kenya declared that, as a young nation, it was to be guided by a shade of 
democracy referred to as Democratic African Socialism. Democratic African Socialism is based on 
African traditions where in terms of governance, political democracy and social mutual responsibility 
are the two underlying principles (GoK 1964, p.3). Political democracy refers to a situation where all 
members of a society have equal political rights and that no individual or group could be allowed to 
have undue influence on affairs  of  the  state.  The principle  of  mutual  social  responsibility can be 
understood as an extension of the African extended family to a wider community in the sense that each 
member of the wider community has an obligation to do the best for his/her neighbour. It is within 
such  a  Democratic  African  Socialism  framework  that  Kenyans  are  supposed  to  negotiate  their 
individual lifestyles and lives. 
For instance in the life of a community, a situation may arise where the rights of an individual 
conflict with the rights of the larger community. According to the authors of Sessional Paper No. 10, 
Democratic African Socialism puts a premium on the rights and importance of the community at the 
expense of the individual (GoK, 1964, p.4). As Mbiti has said, “I am because we are” (Mbiti, 1969). 
This definition of democracy is rather different from Western liberal democracy where the rights of 
the individual tend to be emphasised at the expense of the community (Gould, 1988, p.31; McPherson, 
1973, p.4). Democratic African Socialism as articulated here is identifiable with Ubuntu (a shade) of 
democracy,  which  many scholars  in  African affairs  have argued,  is  an appropriate  framework  to 
inform governance  in  Africa  (Kubow,  2007).  However,  it  has  also  been  argued  that,  while  the 
education system in Kenya is supposed to champion Democratic African Socialism in students, in 
practice  it  encourages  some  sort  of  liberal  democracy  where  individualism  tend  to  be  over-
emphasised. This seems to happen because schools tend to emphasise competition amongst students 
rather than co-operation, especially during examinations. Thus while the Kenya Government claimed 
to uphold Democratic African Socialism, little attention is paid to this in the implementation of other 
educational practices within Kenyan contexts.
There are also conceptual issues related to the process of inculcating youth citizenship through 
the school system. For example, while the educators urge schools to encourage socio-cultural values, 
there are those who advise these youths who hail from different cultural and racial backgrounds to 
preserve their cultural heritage. The Kamunge Committee, for example, points out the double-edged 
nature of culture and states: ‘(…) in the process of change and adaptation, care should be taken to 
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ensure that only positive aspects of cultural practices are retained or adapted with a view to enriching 
and developing the national culture’ (GoK, 1988, p.6). 
Recent  research  by Kubow (2007)  suggests  that  there  are  currently  considerable  tensions 
between the concept of democracy which is associated with rights, and liberal definitions of freedom 
(e.g. freedom of speech, movement), and local cultures and indigenous knowledge. In Kubow’s study, 
teachers in Kenya and South Africa21 were able to articulate democracy as a value which they believed 
in but  they had difficulties when such values challenged local  undemocratic practices particularly 
those associated with gender. Supporting notions of women’s rights and the right of all to equality, the 
Kenyan teachers in this study repeatedly referred to unequal power relations between men and women 
in local communities and the lack of women’s freedom. They were aware that challenges to local 
social structures could undermine traditional cultural gender norms.  So, for example, teachers had 
difficulties in encouraging girls to have the courage to ask questions in class in a culture where they 
are told not to answer back in the home, where they might be forced into early marriage and where 
serving  men  was  more  important  than  their  own  education.  Teachers  also  wrestled  with  the 
incongruence between the concept of faithfulness and loyalty when confronted with a father with three 
wives and a brother with two. A small extract of the conversation between the Kenyan teachers from 
this study illustrates this point:
Qu: What attributes, traits or behaviours should democratic Kenyan citizens have?
Male teacher: Able to depart with cultural practices that can interfere [with democracy] a person 
who is in a position to shake off cultural practices.
Qu: For example?
Male  teacher:  You … have practices  where  some  boys  and  girls  are  not  taken to  school...  if 
educating a girl, you educate the whole country. People uphold man as head of family...  [they] 
might be in a position to guide democracy for children...
Female teacher 1: That is the cultural discussion in Kenyan society […]
Female teacher 1: Gender disparity ... Some jobs for men [are] not for ladies. While man is just 
waiting,  women  are  preparing  food.  Now there  is  politics  in  Kenya.  If  a  woman  moves  into 
politics, she will be an outcast and others will start to despise her.
Female teacher 1: We would like a balance between the genders.....
Female teacher 2: Add to that, women are belittled. Someone has to teach [the children] that it is 
good for women to develop because they are not viewed very well.
21 Using focus groups with Kenyan teachers in five schools, Kubow asked what characteristics/traits Kenyan 
citizens need to function in a democratic society.
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Female teacher 3: The parent will pay for the boy and leave the girl. Girl child sent home and boy 
left learning. Priorities given to boys. ... Brother smarter than the girl because the boy is active in 
his studies.
Female  teacher  2: Another  problem with  women  [is  that]  women  see  themselves  as  inferior. 
Women are mentally strong, but women [are] weak at home. [Women are] shouted at at home. In 
church, women can’t read the Bible in front of people. Women [are considered] inferior. Women 
need to be told this is the right point [in time] to say something, to speak up. (Kubow, 2007, p. 321)
The lack of local democracy in the community and the home in relation to gender is a strong 
theme in Kubow’s findings. However the study also reveals how teachers try to mediate democratic 
notions so that it does not, as a totalising narrative devalue local knowledges and customs. They tried 
to find ways of linking individuals to their communities, cultural values, and ethnic loyalties whilst at 
the same time challenging what are seen as the more oppressive practices. The result is a difficult 
agenda around how to create in young people, individual confidence, self-esteem and agency whilst 
encouraging communality and a sense of community. For the teachers from Kenya and South Africa:
‘...democracy entails balancing individual freedom with respect and continually assessing 
local and global influences that expand or constrain freedom and agency for each of their 
society’s members’ (Kubow, 2007, p.324). 
However, these are not the only difficulties in terms of linking democracy to cultural traditions. 
There have been attempts to use Religious Education to promote social cohesion among the students. 
Three different religious doctrines (Christianity, Islam and Hinduism) are taught to different groups of 
students. These world religions are based on different philosophical principles with different ethical 
perspectives. How then does the school, comprising teachers of different religious allegiances, tease 
out what is to be retained and what to be omitted in the various religious doctrines? Different cultural 
and  religious  values  are  embedded  in  different  ethnic  groups—an  inclusive  citizenship  implies 
validation and valuing of these traditions.   There is  always  a danger that  youth  from a particular 
ethnic-religious group will  find themselves  and their  cultures marginalised in formal  education,  a 
sense of exclusion that carries forward into the economic sphere and leads to social and economic 
disadvantage.  It  is  important  to  encourage youth  to  identify themselves  not  just  with their  ethnic 
communities but with national and global citizenship. This calls for educators to try and find out how 
an education system could be used effectively to help young people  to  develop positive multiple 
identities simultaneously (Ross, 2007). 
The  structure  of  governance  adopted  by  the  school  system  and  culture  of  the  hidden 
curriculum has also raised serious concerns about its ability to sustain an inclusive citizenship. As 
Sifuna  (2000)  argues,  while  the  Kenyan  education  system is  well-placed  to  inculcate  democratic 
practices, the authoritarian structures of Kenyan schools tend to encourage non-tolerance and blind 
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unquestioning  in  young  people  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  principles  upon  which  democracy 
flourishes. He asserts that increased schooling per se is not sufficient in bringing about the required 
democratic  inclination  in  society.  This  observation  resonates  with  that  of  Wamahiu  (1999)  who 
witnessed the  lack of  participation by pupils  in  school  and classroom cultures  in  the  majority  of 
schools  in  Kenya.  Authoritarian  pedagogies  routinely  use  threats,  verbal  abuse  and  physical 
punishments,  which  impact  negatively  on  young  people’s  relationship  to  democratic  citizenship. 
Research findings from 92 schools suggest that there is a close relationship between democratic school 
administrative and pedagogical practices and the students’ social capabilities (see Wakhulia, 2004). It 
is recognised that school cultures play a central role in shaping the democratic outlook that young 
people eventually acquire or do not acquire (ibid). In a study with university student teachers who 
used their diaries of memories of violence against children in education settings, Chege (2006) found 
that, right from pre-school education through to university, girls and boys are subjected to persistent 
undemocratic school  practices of emotional and physical  abuse.  In this  kind of school culture, an 
explicit contradiction exists between lived cultures of non-democratic practices of the school and the 
ideals  of  a  democratic  education  system (see  also  Sifuna,  2000).  According  to  Chege,  the  girls’ 
memory diaries describe a complex combination of forms of violence in the school that was both 
sexual and physical and meted out by the teachers and sometimes by their male peers. In comparison, 
the  diaries  of  the  boys  portrayed  more  violence of  the  physical  type  from teachers,  mainly male 
teachers. This gendered violence noted in schools was reflected in the students’ experiences outside 
the school—in family and community.  Arguably,  when the school loses its potential to act as the 
intervening agent in breaking the cycle of violence, the hope of nurturing a democratic society that is 
free of all forms of violence dwindles. 
As the young population continues to grow in Kenya,  education continues to makes little 
observable or tangible impact on the development of citizenship among the 15-29 age groups who 
may be running out of  survival  options.  This observation is demonstrated empirically by a recent 
survey by Centre for the Study of Adolescence on the state of the youth in Kenya which found that 
more than half of all the convicted criminals in the country’s jails were young people between 16 and 
25  years  (Daily  Nation Aug.  18,  2007).  Another  survey  carried  out  by  the  BBC  on  ten  cities 
worldwide, and involving more than 3,000 youth in the 15-17 age group found that 81% of the youth 
living in Nairobi would readily emigrate to other countries if opportunities arose for them to make a 
better future (ibid). It is not clear that youth are functional citizens who are prepared to shoulder the 
responsibilities of their country. Instead, the lack of recognition of young people’s political agency and 
opportunities to exercise that  agency is  forcing them to take up negative social  roles,  which may 
include joining gangs that  participate in criminal  activities such as robbery and political  violence. 
Some people have argued that yob or hooliganism behaviour among some of the Kenyan youth may 
be a justifiable expression of feeling let down and left out of social and political participation. Notably, 
youth tend to: ‘spend half their lives being lectured on the importance of education. They are urged to 
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break their necks to get good grades. They do so. Then they step out into the world anticipating the 
employment  windfall  and  finding  nothing’  (Daily  Nation, Aug.  20,  2007).  The  outcomes  of  the 
various government reports, commissions and strategies suggest that the direction of young Kenyan’s 
lives  in  terms  of  their  dreams,  aspirations,  expectations,  hopes,  anxieties,  fears  and  concerns  is 
somewhat confused. 
Meanwhile, outside school, several new political initiatives have emerged in the last decade 
which have affected and may continue to affect the lives of young people and their participation in the 
national and global citizenry. For example, both the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (1999) and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), to which 
Kenya  is  signatory have influenced—and will  probably continue to  influence—the articulation of 
government policy on youth matters. The African Charter expresses clearly what children and young 
people ought to expect of their governments and what responsibilities children have in partnering with 
their duty bearers—for example, teachers, parents as well as leaders (religious and political) as they 
explore their psychological and physical space as Kenyans.  This development provides a basis for 
strengthening legislation and developing structures that foreground matters affecting young people and 
children.  This  way,  issues  relating to  education,  health  and health  services,  disability and special 
needs, leisure and culture, care and protection from sexual and labour exploitation, discrimination by 
gender, creed, socio-economic status, regional origin, among others are identified and defined in the 
context of rights and responsibilities that form the tenets upon which citizenship may be nurtured 
amongst young people as they transit to adulthood. 
In response to global, regional and national concerns regarding the youth, the Consortium on 
Education of the Marginalized Categories (CEDMAC 2001) has produced an educational handbook on 
democratic  issues  and  human  rights,  which  young  people  access  freely through  the  civil  society 
organisations (CSOs) that currently engage young people in a more vibrant form of civic and political 
education.  There  appears  to  be  more  visibly active  youth  work which  raises  pertinent  social  and 
political issues. Many of the CSOs address not just the principles of democracy that should govern 
institutions and life in general, but also the different types of rights to which a Kenyan is entitled. They 
sensitise youth to local forms of power relations and freedoms and teach them to interrogate concepts 
of equality and equity. 
In addition, in 2003 the Kenyan government established for the first time a Ministry for Youth 
Affairs whose mandate is to address issues affecting young Kenyan especially that of poverty and 
disillusionment among Kenyan youth who constitute two thirds of the population and who form the 
majority of the people who are unemployed. The government allocated one billion Kenya Shillings to 
the Ministry of Youth Affairs to be offered to youth organisations for self-employment activities, in 
order to ease the pressure to provide scarce so-called ‘white collar jobs’.
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Increased attention is  now also focused  on  the  gendering  of  citizenship.  The  aim of  this 
strategy is to conscientize the young people on the added value accrued when women and men are 
accorded space to participate equally as allies in both the private space of the home and the public 
worlds of work and politics. The role of gender in acquiring citizenship status has, therefore, become a 
major concern mainly among women’s organisations that included the Federation of Women Lawyers 
(FIDA, 1990), the Law Society of Kenya22 and the League of Kenya Women Voters (1992/1997), 
popularly referred to as the League. Both FIDA and the League have produced documents aimed at 
educating women on how to pursue their legal and human rights as citizens of Kenya and the world. 
FIDA (1990) provides a brief analysis of the Kenyan legal structure and system and how this functions 
for women with regard to issues of marriage, divorce, rights to inheritance, protection from sexual and 
domestic violence, among other legal concerns.23 By the early 1990s, the League of Kenya Women 
Voters (1992/1997) aimed at sensitising Kenya women to the historical and pivotal roles of women in 
political struggles of the nation, and their role alongside men at the centre of nation building.24 It also 
addressed issues of gender discrimination singling out the legal system as supportive of laws that 
denied  women  the  right  to  property,  land,  and  child  custody  among  other  things.  Issues  of 
discrimination in the education system, business and agriculture, health provision and politics were a 
key focus alongside information about how these affected the position of women both in the public 
and private arena. The FIDA booklets also offer basic education on voting rights and procedures as 
well as how to encourage and support women’s inclusion in mainstream politics. These kinds of ‘easy-
to-read’ civic education documents play a key role in persuading men and women to work together 
and hence model  a gender cohesive citizenship for the youth.  By the mid 1990s,  the League had 
pushed the women’s political agenda forward to include agitation for constitutional reforms that would 
embrace women’s agendas, and the education of female citizens. 
As Otiende and Njoroge (2001) note, academia has not been left behind in addressing issues 
of  how to educate  young  people  for  democracy and citizenship.  Academics  have focused on  the 
process  of  democratisation,  the  role  of  schooling  in  educating  for  human  rights,  education  for 
challenging  patriarchy  and  enhancing  democratic  principles  and  the  process  of  democratising 
universities in the 21st century. Many academics were involved in the drafting of the current (stalled) 
draft  constitution of Kenya.  In this proposed constitution, issues on gender, education and human 
rights are explicitly underscored (see Draft Constitution of Kenya, 2005).25
22 The Law Society of Kenya et.al. (n.d.), published its own booklet which outlines the characteristics of the kind 
of nation and government that Kenyans should demand.
23 In a relatively reader-friendly way, it also explains the various laws that operate in Kenya and in which women 
needed guidance. These include the statutory, customary, Muslim and Hindu laws
24 See the Women in History Series by the Women Educational Researchers, 1995.
25 Although still in draft form, the proposed Kenyan Constitution has had direct impact on government policy 
that  requires,  for  example,  that  the  minimum accepted  representation  of  either  gender  in  any  government 
appointments is one third, while the ideal should be on a fifty-fifty (equal) basis. This policy is already being 
witnessed not only in public offices but also influencing the private sector.
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Many of the young and older Kenyans are now cognizant of the fact that citizenship rights as 
entitlements are inconsistent with discriminatory practices based on gender, disability, HIV and AIDS 
status, regional origin, religious affiliation, among others. Local and international organizations that 
monitor, document and report on human rights abuses and are credited with informing and educating 
the  public  in  a  process  that  also  includes  ‘naming  and  shaming’  alleged  abusers.  For  example, 
according to a report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW 2005), governments in sub-Saharan Africa 
stand accused of failing to address the extraordinary barriers to education faced by children who are 
orphaned  or  otherwise  affected  by  HIV/AIDS.  The  HRW  observes  that,  while  providing  limited 
support to community efforts that support orphans, governments have failed to address the unique 
disadvantages faced by AIDS-affected children, with the result that these children are less likely than 
their peers to enroll, attend, or advance in school. This report,  like others of its kind, is based on 
detailed interviews with children affected by HIV/AIDS and their  caregivers in three sub-Saharan 
African countries—Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda. Their testimonies revolve around a common 
theme: neglect and abuse within families, in communities, and by schools and governments that have 
hindered  AIDS-affected  children’s  ability  to  enrol,  remain,  or  advance  in  school.  This  situation 
questions  how children  living  with  such  conditions  could  develop  a  sense  of  belonging  to  their 
country, community and family as equal citizens. This argument is congruent with other youth related 
issues such as regional marginalisation of goods and services for communities such as those from 
northern Kenya,  disabled persons,  as well  as women and girls.  The Arid and Semi-Arid (ASAL) 
districts of Northern Kenya, for example, present an even more disconcerting picture of the highest 
incidence of poverty in the country whereby the poor account for 80% of the population (GoK, 2002, 
p. xii). Yet, this is the area where access to education has been historically low compared to other 
areas of the country (ibid). The inhabitants of this region are often explicit in defining themselves as 
living outside Kenya,  which implies that  they do not  feel  Kenyan despite having a legal  Kenyan 
identity card that makes them legally, Kenyan citizens. 
In sum, what is noticeable in the Kenyan narrative is that since independence, both the public 
and the  government  strongly believe that  economic  development  is  a  key to  national  growth and 
poverty eradication and that educational outcomes play a key role in this relationship (GoK, 2002; 
GoK, 1999a and b).  However, while the government seems to link education outcomes with both 
economic and social advancement, the Kenyan education system, in practice, has always tended to 
over-emphasize the economic development-oriented aspects at the expense of the social development-
oriented aspects especially the humanities and particularly education for social values. Although the 
government  realizes  that  the  youth  stage is  an important  milestone  for  an individual  or  group to 
develop a sense of identity as citizens of a particular country. There seems to be considerable anxiety 
and a sense of feeling excluded from full citizenship amongst Kenyan youth. This is attested to by the 
recent gruesome anti-social activities perpetrated by youth gangs in and around Nairobi (Daily Nation, 
May 7, 2007). Even more disturbing is the post-2007 election violence that portrayed many youth 
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partaking in the destruction of lives and property of fellow Kenyans. This behaviour challenges not 
just politicians but also educators and educationalists
Despite  the commitment  by the  Kenyan  government  and the  CSOs to promote  a  Kenyan 
citizenship through mutual social responsibility as noted in all the documents reviewed above, it is 
evident that school-based subjects—in and of themselves—be they the social-oriented disciplines such 
as  History,  Literature,  Social  Education  and  Ethics  or  Social  Studies  are  not  effective,  not  least 
because they are not implemented in ways that foster the inculcation of citizenship ideals in the youths 
so that they can have a sense of being proud members of the Kenyan community. Without such an 
identity, can young people at the margins of society find a way out of their economic predicament? 
Further,  there  is  currently  a  dearth  of  researched-based  documented  evidence  to  support  the 
assumptions that the socially-oriented content as part of our curriculum would yield socially well-
adjusted youth. 
The teaching of liberal democracy and individual human rights has major implications; but as 
Nicholas Otieno (2002:20)26 argues: ‘If one is serious about change, one must accept the challenge to 
be changed’. As Kenyan teachers point out, confidence, self esteem and the promotion of agency are 
key  to  the  teaching  of  democracy,  as  is  the  need  to  promote  ‘more  socially  just  environments’ 
(Kubow, p. 318). The rights and responsibilities of individual freedom have to be balanced against the 
cultural ideas and practice that give individuals meaning. Dependence on others is an essential part of 
membership of a community,  of a social ethos, and a communality.  Social responsibility cannot be 
sacrificed to individual’s desire, needs, and interests if democracy is to be a civilising force (ibid., p. 
322).  Kanyinga (2002:  47-48)27 argues that in Kenya,  ‘Civil  society is ...  a sphere of freedom—a 
sphere of constructing and articulating collective relations and interests’. 
EDUCATION AND NATION-BUILDING IN GHANA 
The approach to youth citizenship and citizenship education in Ghana has considerable similarities 
with that of Kenya. However, there are also some important differences not the least various Ghanaian 
governments’  attempts,  post-independence,  to  use  citizenship  education  specifically  to  move  to  a 
culture of human rights and engagement with global change. Here too the government school system 
is the site chosen to educate young citizens in the values of the newly independent society, in this case 
through  a  compulsory  curriculum in  citizenship  education  in  basic/primary  as  well  as  secondary 
school and through a range of civic education programmes. However, by 2004 new strategies were 
required which focus directly on youth as a policy issue. The delivery of the Millennium Development 
Goals especially in relation to poverty reduction is recognised to be dependent on the achievement of 
greater  involvement  of  young  Ghanaians.  In  the  last  decade,  calls  for  a  more  inclusive  form of 
26 Quoted in Kubow (2007, p. 325)
27 Quoted in Kubow (ibid. p.318)
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schooling and more directed programmes around citizenship education suggest that young people are 
now seen as more rather than less critical to the economic development of Ghana.
In 2006, a fairly high proportion of the Ghanaian population (some 26%) was constituted by 
the youth who fell within the age range of 15-35 years. The Ghanaian population below the poverty 
line as of  2005/06 was 28% according to the Ghana Living Standards Survey of 2005/06.  About 
11.6% of the total population are unemployed of which a large percentage is in the youth category 
(UNICEF,  2006).  The involvement  of  this  age group in  the  Ghanaian economy is  now cause for 
considerable concern not least since as the Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment’s (2006) 
report  Ghana Youth: working to build our future  found a lack of a ‘coherent national development 
policy and comprehensive strategy to deal with the conditions that will facilitate their [young people’s] 
economic empowerment’ (p.1). The Report identified a range of educational, political and economic 
factors which have negatively affected their low economic status and opportunities. These included:  
• The introduction of the Junior Secondary School and Senior Secondary School (JSS and SSS) 
system of education ‘without adequate planning for integration into the trades/vocations and 
job placements’ (p.1). 
• ‘Education and training have no link to the needs of the important sectors of the economy 
(i.e. agriculture, commerce and industry, etc)’ (ibid). 
• The near  collapse  of  the  industrial  base  of  Ghana due to  ineffective  management  of  the 
divestiture  process  which  resulted  in  the  closure  of  many  factories  without  a  structural 
transformation of the economy to generate alternative jobs for people (ibid) 
As a result of this report, the Ghanaian government instituted a youth programme aimed at the 
creation of employment opportunities ‘to enable youth to engage themselves productively as well as to 
prepare for  their  future security’  (ibid p.  v).   This drive to address the problems of youth  relates 
directly to the agenda surrounding youth citizenship. The focus of this new programme, like that of the 
World Bank, was to identify youth as stakeholders in a new economy. The argument was that young 
people needed to participate fully in developmental processes, by obtaining the necessary capacities 
that ensure the development of their talents.  They are defined as ‘the future’ and ‘their welfare is our 
insurance for a prosperous and secure tomorrow’ (ibid p. v).
This recognition of the importance of focusing on youth and their experiences was boosted by 
the Millennium Development Goals—one ambition apparently servicing the other. As E. K. Edudzie 
of the Youth Employment Summit (YES) in Ghana28 commented:  
The global campaign to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provides 
the greatest  opportunity for  meeting the needs of  young people in particular,  and the 
entire mankind at large, to create a new world order devoid of poverty and deprivation. 
28 There  is  also  YEN (Youth,  Employment  Network)  which  is  a  non-governmental  organisation  in  Ghana 
promoting youth employment, youth policy and rights in Ghana.
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The full  participation and empowerment  of  youth especially  at  the national  and 
grassroots levels are indispensable for achieving the targets set out in the MDGs. 
Youth participation is vital for equitable and sustainable policy and project outcomes, 
which not only benefits the youths themselves but also the wellbeing of the entire nation. 
Youth empowerment, through education and consciousness will strengthen relationships 
between  individuals,  civic  society,  NGOs  and  governments  leading  to  an  integrated 
approach to achieving the MDGs. (Edudzie, 2006, p1) (our emphasis)    
As a consequence the governing party (the National Patriotic Party NPP) in 2001 tried to 
address youth employment. It also set up a range of government commissions to address the education 
of young people into citizenship through the framework of human rights.29 These two agendas today—
one which  encourages  economic  development,  and the  other  which  encourages  individual  human 
rights appear compatible, yet the ways in which Ghana has developed the capabilities of its youth as 
citizens and the formation of youth citizenship identities is a far more complex story. Like Kenya, 
Ghanaian national independence placed schooling reform high on the political agenda and within that, 
the need to educate young people on how to engage with the national building project. Unfortunately 
however, whilst  the political  objectives were strongly defined, it  was likely to fail  to reach many 
marginalised young people living in poverty, and to confuse those who managed to attend schools. 
Below we revisit the history of citizenship education in Ghana, where considerable efforts were made 
to  redefine  the  rights  of  young  citizens  and  their  social  responsibilities  through  a  compulsory 
curriculum and a new constitution. 
The education of the young citizen in Ghana
Kwame Nkrumah as the first President of Ghana following independence in 1957, however, set a new 
agenda for the country in several speeches in the late 1950’s. He articulated his political vision of mass 
education as a means to nation building, stating that: 
The great task before us is education—intensive ideological education both of the masses and 
of ourselves, to enable us to understand our purpose and our objectives (Nkrumah quoted in 
Obeng, 1960, p.50). 
Nkrumah ‘was explicitly committed to utilising the education system for the purpose of instilling a 
sense of loyalty to Ghana’ (Harber, 1989:p. 154), particularly through the use of the Young Pioneer 
Movement which aimed to ‘indoctrinate the youth with the basic dogmas of Nkrumaism and a fuller 
comprehension of  their  role  in  Ghana’  (ibid p.  155).  According to  Quist  (2001)  Nkrumah  was a 
leading advocate of the ‘African personality’ which was shaped less by a static past, and more by a 
complex new interface between Islamic and Euro-Christian influences. The new harmony of these 
three traditions would take Ghana forward into the postcolonial world (p.305).
29 This agenda encourages a different discourse around rights rather than responsibilities, around entitlements 
from the state rather than participation and duties as citizens. 
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Nkrumah’s  government  immediately  intervened in  the  education  system by offering  Free 
Universal Basic Education for all children in Ghana—a decisive departure from the previous colonial 
governments which had focused on providing education for the Ghanaian elite (Antwi, 1992). The 
Education Act of 1961 made it compulsory for every local authority to ‘contribute to the spiritual, 
moral,  mental  and  physical  development  of  the  community  by  securing  that  efficient  education 
throughout the primary and middle stages shall be available to meet the needs of the population in its 
area’ (Bening, 1990. p 216).  The political culture of the nation as well as its economic, social and 
political development would, in the long run, also be supported by secondary and tertiary education 
(ibid).
However, a clear gap emerged between the political strategies of Nkrumah and successive 
governments which placed more emphasis upon the economic rather than the cultural and civic aspects 
of national development (Casely-Hayford, 2000). Nkrumah’s lofty nationalistic goals faded as Ghana 
underwent  a  series  of  political  upheavals.  Reform in  the  education  system became  the  focus  of 
successive governments beginning with Busia in the late 1960's whose new priorities were ones of 
economic relevance, emphasising the need for education to adjust itself to the local context of the 
people in order for community and national development to take place (Busia, 1969).30 The next ten 
years were characterised by political upheaval and instability not least because of the heavy influence 
of international goals for education. Pryor observed that the education system in Ghana: ‘has its roots 
not in traditional cultural practices but in colonialism. Although it might be seen as developing away 
from this, rather than moving towards some particular local model, it is adjusting to an increasingly 
global agenda’ (Pryor, 1998, p. 221). Achieving economic growth and middle income status for the 
country became increasingly an externally defined path shaped by the structural adjustment and 'new 
growth' strategies of the World Bank and IMF (Watkins, 2000). Educational policy reform programs 
were tied to the funding and philosophies of international economic institutions with less autonomy 
given to Ghanaian leaders and policy makers (Casely-Hayford, 2000). This was particularly apparent 
within  the  Education  sector  where  programmes  to  educate  young  Ghanaians  were  increasingly 
designed according to donor expectations and conditionalities (ERNWACA, 1996). 
Ghana’s education reform agenda was more about moulding the citizen in ways that were 
conducive to achieving global targets and economic growth.31 On the positive side, education became 
firmly established as one of the main instruments for national development (even though this was 
rarely articulated by Ghana's own political leadership).32 Resources were refocused on primary and 
30 The first report on the structure and content of education was formulated in 1966, the main elements of which 
re-emerged  almost  20 years  later,  in  1987, under  the Educational  Reform programme of  the  J.J.  Rawling's 
Government (Sutherland-Addy, 1997).  
31 Part  of  this  'global  agenda'  was  the  drive  towards  Education  for  All  (EFA)  in  the  early  1990's  and  the 
successive policy events and programmes to achieve Universal Basic Education.
32 See World Bank, (1995) Priorities and Strategies for Education: A World Bank Review. See also King E. et al 
(1992) Human Resource Development and Economic Growth: Ghana in the next two decades. 
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junior  secondary  school  systems.33 A  more  negative  assessment  was  that  the  educational  agenda 
attempted to convince local citizens to send all their children to school with little or no understanding 
of the ultimate outcomes the education system might offer. Studies in Ghanaian education in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century, for example, reveal that rural children were alienated from their 
local communities and indigenous culture as a result of the limited integration of concepts of cultural 
identity, and diversity and belonging with the goals of national development (Sefa Dei, 2001; 2005a 
and b; Sefa Dei and Opinini, 2007; Casely-Hayford, 2000).  
By 1987 an Education Reform programme initiated a total restructuring of the entire pre-
tertiary education system, reducing the number of years of schooling from 17 to 12. Although there 
were to be fewer years of schooling, the programme focussed on improving access at primary level 
through infrastructural  reform,  and making the curriculum more relevant  to socio-economic needs 
(Sutherland Addy, 1997). The governance of schooling was also reshaped by decentralisation with the 
number of school districts increased, and greater powers given to District Assemblies which were now 
held responsible for educational provision and infrastructure. District Assemblies became key focal 
institutions for central government and external agencies involved in policy implementation (National 
Development Planning Commission, 1995). 
Despite such reforms in the name of economic development, social inequality in educational 
opportunities  is  still  considerable.  Agyemang-Mensah  (1998)  in  his  study  of  the  impact  on  the 
implementation of  the Convention of the Rights of  the Child in Ghana,  for  example,  argued that 
poverty was the main cause of continuing social inequality amongst youth. Also implicated were many 
socio-cultural factors such as the belief in adult supremacy,  gender discrimination, early girl child 
marriages, divorce, fostering, polygamy, female gentle mutilation (FGM), tribal marks, food taboos, 
division of labour in the family, belief in the need to discipline children as well as the low value of 
education  in  some  areas.  Controls  on  young  people’s  freedom of  expression  and  especially  the 
deprivation of girls’ equal rights in society, the lack of equal rights to education with boys and the lack 
of access to good nutrition were also important in shaping such social inequality. Agyemang-Mensah’s 
list also included religious fanaticism which resulted in children not being allowed to attend schools 
that  observed  other  religious  practices  and  geographical  factors  such  as  inaccessibility  to  social 
amenities such as clinics, schools, good roads, etc as well as migration.
By 2001, the absence of an effective legal regime that regulates education was recognised to 
be an issue by the report of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports/Ghana Education Service 
(MOE/GES, 2001) which suggested that:
• ‘Local education authorities should provide alternative education for the out of school children 
in their areas of authority’
• ‘Children shall not be sent out of school for non-payment of levies of whatever nature’ 
33 This encouraged a lowering of resource allocation for the senior and tertiary level institutions. 
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• ‘The state shall ensure that provision is made for pupils who suffer from any disability of mind 
or body by providing either in school or otherwise, special educational treatment, which is to 
say education by special methods appropriate for persons suffering from disability’
• ‘School discipline shall be administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human dignity’
• ‘It  shall  be an offence for any parent or guardian to withdraw a child from school for any 
purpose whatsoever except for reasons of transfer to another school or for health reasons’
• ‘School heads with the approval of the district education oversight committee of the area shall 
have the authority to schedule school hours, days and holdings as are comfortable for the pupils 
having regard to local circumstances’. 
• ‘It shall be the duty of every district assembly to provide regular medical examination of pupils 
in their areas of authority’.
• ‘No  proprietor  of  a  private  school  shall  determine  and  charge  fees  without  first  seeking 
approval for same from the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports’. 
• ‘No  proprietor  of  a  private  school  shall  impose  levies  on  parents  for  the  purpose  of 
infrastructural development or rehabilitation’.
• ‘School  management  committees  should  be  instituted  in  all  schools  and  charged  with  the 
responsibility of managing the school’ (2001, pp. ix—x).
The basic value of education to life,  according to the Ministry of  Education, Science and 
Sports/Ghana Education Service (MOE/GES 2001:3) was self-evident. Education was said to be ‘the 
root of all development’, ‘the crucible for democracy and liberty and is as indispensable to national 
development as it is to individual development’. Further, the value of basic education was recognised 
as a ‘precondition for the exercise of human rights’. The employment of many civil and political rights 
such as freedom of information, expression, assembly and association, the right to vote and to be 
elected or the right of equal access to public service depends on at least a minimum level of education, 
including literacy. Similarly, 
many economic, social and cultural rights such as the right to choose work, to receive equal 
pay for equal work, the right to form trade unions, to take part in cultural life, to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and to receive higher education on the basis of capacity can only 
be exercised in a meaningful way after a minimum level of education has been achieved’ 
(ibid., p.4). 
With respect to young people’s rights to education,34 the Constitution of Ghana stipulated that: 
the child has a right to education and the state’s duty is to ensure that primary education is free 
and compulsory, to encourage different forms of secondary education accessible to every child 
34 Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN 1989).
32
and to make higher education accessible to every child and to make higher education available 
to all on the basis of capacity (Government of Ghana 2003a, p.16).
The  Ministry  of  Education  and  the  Ghana  Education  Service  (MOE/GES,  2001)  recognised  that 
education was a necessity for survival in the modern world and that it was the primary responsibility 
of the government to ensure the realisation of this basic right and the Ghana Education Service, 2004). 
Indeed the lack of educational opportunities for children was recognised as potentially reinforcing 
‘their  subjection  to  various  other  human  rights  violations’  (MOE/GES,  2001  p.5).  Consequently, 
children deprived of education are particularly vulnerable to economic exploitation. 
Despite decentralisation, the Presidential Commission in 2002 found declining quality of the 
educational system, an alienation of the citizenry from policy reform and the inequities within the 
system. The NPP Government under the leadership of President Kuffour, when only a little over a year 
in power, responded by setting up the Presidential Commission alongside several internal educational 
reviews to look into the problems of education. Government of Ghana, (2002) which found that the 
majority of young people within tertiary institutions came from urban elite homes (Addae Mensah, 
2000). The education system was not meeting the needs of local communities nor was it meeting the 
developmental needs of the nation since a large percentage of tertiary-trained professionals every year 
leaves the country (Oduro, 2008; Casely-Hayford, 2000).35  
The  causes  of  such  inequalities  in  educational  opportunities  are  complex.  The  lack  of 
inclusivity  of  the  Ghanaian  education  system  for  young  citizens  has  clearly  been  a  matter  of 
considerable concern to the Ghanaian government. Some of the problems have been attributed to the 
failure to a large extent of the state to alter the existing education system to reflect new circumstances 
and social realities (e.g. the problem of curriculum relevance and employment needs of young people) 
(Sefa Dei, 2005a). The lack of resources and the lack of sufficiently strong state regulation have also 
affected  the  delivery of  this  complex  political  agenda.  Stagnating  school  enrolments,  the  lack  of 
textbooks  and  instructional  materials,  the  inadequacy of  teacher  training,  diminishing  educational 
finances  and the  lack of  efficiency of  educational  administration and management  practices  were 
associated with the failure to deliver quality education to all Ghanaian youth. 
The task for the Ghanaian government has been considerable not least because more than fifty 
years after independence well over 17% of young people in Ghana are not in school. Also evidence on 
literacy attainment among Ghanaian children continues to indicate that only 20-25% of the school 
going age population are able to master basic skills of reading and writing in English by Primary 6 
(Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2008). Recent research by Oduro (2008) indicates that some 17% of 
the 15 to 24 age cohort and 31% of the 25 to 35 age cohort still had never been to school. The literacy 
rates are much worse for the rural poor children and better for the urban based children (MOESS, 
35 Oduro’s work based on Ghana Statistical Service Questionnaire (CWIQ, 2003) found that over 40% of tertiary 
trained graduates were no longer in the age cohort population after having completed tertiary education.
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2006).36 However, despite such difficulties, by 2008, access to formal education has been growing at a 
rapid rate. The school going population has increased from 1.68 million in 1987 to 3.12 million in 
2006 (Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2008). Gross enrolment ratios (GER) have also increased from 
75% in 1987 to over 85% in 2005. This growth has been mainly due to the increasing state payment 
for schooling through the introduction of safety net programs such as school feeding and capitation 
grants to districts and schools which have helped to remove user fees for sports and cultural events 
(Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2008). 
Alongside such educational reform, the Ghanaian government, since independence, continues 
to attempt to frame its own national civic virtues and values, establish its own agenda to develop the 
capabilities of young Ghanaians. Here, the story is even more complex—civic education programmes 
and programmes  for  youth  development  and action have attempted  to sustain a  complex  political 
collage  of  patriotic,  and  unifying  nationalistic  values,  individualised  human  rights  and  self-help 
agendas whilst sustaining traditional cultural values and identities. 
From public responsibilities to individual rights 
Since 1948,  the Ghanaian government  has attempted  to  build a  political  culture  which unifies an 
ethnically diverse and socially unequal nation. In this context, it is important to note the increased 
range of identities and roles which young Ghanaians have been asked to acquire through schooling. 
The  extent  to  which  they  were  offered  notions  of  agency  and  an  active  citizenship  is  equally 
significant. 
The introduction of citizenship education dates back to  Nkrumah who, in 1948, inaugurated 
the subject in a document entitled 'Education for All' (Tuwor, 2005). Here he stated that:
the purpose of this document was to study the techniques needed to prepare people for 
responsibility,  and examine  generally the  problem of  building up a  sense of  public 
responsibility, tolerance and objectivity in discussion and practice, and appreciation of 
political institutions, their evolution and progress (quoted in Tuwor, 2005, p. 3)
Nkrumah’s  government  introduced  civic  education  into  elementary  schools.  Tuwor  (2005) 
claims that, in this period the subject was used to train the students to identify themselves as 
members of a country because individual identity had gone beyond community or ethnic level 
to national  consciousness.  Character training and citizenship were directly taught  in school’ 
(p.3).
However  over  the  next  fifty  years,  what  constituted  civic  education  changed.  Each  new 
educational reform brought in new civic virtues and values. For example, using the recommendations 
of the 1971 Dzobo Committee  Report,  The New Structure and Content of Education,  in 1987  the 
Provisional  National  Defence Council  (PNDC) government  under  the  leadership of  J.J.  Rawlings 
36 National  Examination Assessment  Data for  2006 is  the latest  Government  data available on literacy and 
numeracy testing across P3 and P6 cohorts of the school going population.
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moved civic education into Social Studies as one of six core subjects37 that would be taught from 
primary to secondary school level. The effect would be to ensure that all Ghanaians of school going 
age would receive nine years of training in civic roles and responsibilities, a stronger programme than 
that sustained by the Kenyan government in the same period. This placing of citizenship education 
within  the  newly  implemented  free,  compulsory  basic  education  (FCUBE)  made  sense  within  a 
context where, according to the Ministry of Education (1998) ‘the central goal of the education system 
in Ghana is to ensure that all citizens are equipped with the fundamental knowledge and skills that will 
enable them to become full stakeholders in and beneficiaries of development’ (Tuwor, 2005, p.21). 
Embedded in this curriculum reform was the assertion that young citizens would become participatory 
particularly in shaping their own lives: ‘the reforms are also designed to enable products of the school 
system to play a functional role in the society as informed, participatory citizens, economic producers 
and to pursue self-determined paths to improve the quality of their lives’ (p.4).
Tuwor (2005) further observed that the goal of Social Studies was to provide ‘experiences 
where students can attain a sense of personal, social and civic efficacy’ (p.5). The seven objectives for 
the JSS social studies syllabus aimed at making students aware of developmental issues in relation to 
local environments, national development and global agendas. The emphasis was on knowledge and 
understanding rather than action. Students needed to:
1. Understand the relationship between the social and the physical environment and their impact 
on the development of Ghana;
2. Appreciate the impact of history on current and future development efforts of the country;
3.  Appreciate the various components of the environment and how these could be maintained to 
ensure sustainable development;
4. Recognise the major challenges facing Ghana and be able to develop basic knowledge and 
skills for dealing with such challenges;
5. Understand the dynamics of development in the world and impact on development in Ghana;
6. Develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes needed for personal growth, peaceful co-existence 
and respect for peoples of other nations;
7. Develop a sense of national consciousness and national identity (Tuwor, 2005, p.5). 
Only the last objective directly addressed the ideals of socio-political and national consciousness 
and  unity.  However  by  2005,  Mrs  Kumah  speaking  at  the  World  Congress  on  Civic  Education 
organised in 2005 on behalf of the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE)38 went much 
further, arguing that: ‘The education system must inculcate citizenship, a sense of national pride and 
37 The subjects that were contained in this new syllabus comprised of English Language, Integrated Science, 
Social  Studies,  Religious  Studies,  Ghanaian  Language  and  French,  stipulated  as  core  subjects  at  Junior 
Secondary School and Senior Secondary School levels.
38 The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) is responsible for ensuring that the public is educated 
on their rights and responsibilities as Ghanaian Citizens (cf Akumanyi, 2007).
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identity,  individual rights and responsibilities to promote  national  integration and unity as well  as 
democratic values. It should also foster a sense of commitment to national development’ (Kumah, 
2005, p.12).  Attention to a more active form of democratic citizenship as an educational outcome 
(rather than just as social education or ethics as in Kenya) was now more clearly articulated: 
(T)he school system should serve as a training ground for producing citizens who will 
cherish and embrace democratic values. These values should reflect the spirit of tolerance of 
other people’s views, dialogue, negotiation, compromise and freedom of expression … The 
educational system should nurture individuals to  take  interest  in  local,  institutional  and 
national governance (Kumah, 2005, p.14). 
Several influences have helped shape this broader educational agenda around a participatory 
democratic form of citizenship. In 1992 Ghana’s constitution was revised, capturing the complexity of 
political philosophies and economic goals. The 1992 Constitution (Government of Ghana 2003a, b) 
established a clear list of children’s rights. Like Kenya, Ghana is a signatory to the Convention on the 
Human Rights of the Child. As such the country needed to enable public awareness of individual 
human rights and individual freedoms. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ) was constitutionally charged to support this. Hence Adzoe (1995, p.16) points out that one 
of its  functions  is  ‘to  educate the  public as  to  human rights  and freedoms by such means  as the 
Commission may decide, including publications, lectures and symposia’. 
The  new  Constitution  referenced  what  Adzoe  (1995,  p.4)  calls  fundamental  human  and 
‘constitutional  rights’.  The former  rights  were  not  granted  by government,  instead government(s) 
created and protected the rights and freedoms that individuals possessed39 including the following: 
protection of the right to life and personal liberties; respect for human dignity, protection from slavery 
and forced labour; equality and freedom from discrimination; protection of privacy of home and other 
property; the right to freedom of speech, freedom of thought, religion, assembly, movement, to form 
political parties.
 Ghanaian citizenship is now clearly defined as ‘belonging to a particular country from which 
the individual enjoys certain rights and to which he/she owns certain duties and loyalty’ (Government 
of Ghana, 2003a, p.4; Government of Ghana, 2003b). The third chapter of the new Constitution of 
Ghana  defines  the  various  inclusive  forms  of  citizenship,  these  are;  by birth;  adoption;  marriage 
registration; and through parliament.40 The revised principles, which underlie the relationship of the 
individual to the state, were articulated in the new Constitution, offering a broad cluster of national 
ideals in relation to gender, economy, youth, human rights, freedom, duties of a citizen, etc. The legal 
39 Another classification is that of Asiegbor et al. (2001) and CIVITAS Ghana (2002) who distinguish in the Ghanaian setting 
between: civil and political rights; economic and social rights; and environmental, cultural and developmental rights.
40 Thus any person who was a Ghanaian citizen on the day that the constitution came into effect was allowed to 
continue to be a citizen of Ghana. Similarly, a person born in Ghana or elsewhere, whose parent or grandparent 
is or was a Ghanaian, automatically becomes a citizen of Ghana from the date of his/her birth.
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and political duties of the Ghanaian citizen which were now to be taught in schools are described in 
the constitution (Government of Ghana, 2003a, p. 13-14) were to: 
• Promote the prestige and good name of Ghana and respect the symbols of the nation;
• Uphold and defend the constitution and the laws of Ghana;
• Foster national unity and live in harmony with others;
• Respect the rights,  freedom and legitimate interests of others and generally to refrain from 
doing acts detrimental to the welfare of other persons;
• Work conscientiously in his/her lawfully chosen occupation;
• Protect and preserve public property and expose and combat misuse and waste of public funds 
and property;
• Contribute to the well-being of the community where that citizen lives;
• Defend Ghana and render national service when necessary;
• Cooperate with lawful agencies in the maintenance of law and order;
• Declare his/her income honestly to the appropriate and lawful agencies and to satisfy all tax 
obligations;
• Protect and safeguard the environment.41 
This list captures many of the collective duties of the individual in relation to nationhood and national 
unity, law and order, and notions of mutual social responsibility for the well being of the community. 
The responsibility for developing citizenship education in schools so that it tallies with this 
new draft Constitution has lain largely with the Ministry of Education and the National Commission 
on Civic Education (NCCE).42 The latter is responsible for citizen education within and outside the 
school  system  and  provides  citizenship  services  such  as  public  education  campaigns  on  the 
constitution. This body has the constitutional duty to create awareness among the people about the 
principles and objectives of the Constitution, as a way of enhancing and promoting civil liberties as 
well as civic responsibilities (Adzoe, 1995. p.17).43 
Recently  the  National  Civic  Education  Programme  identified  a  variety  of  curriculum 
principles which appears to have included any and all of these political goals and even the pedagogic 
principles  associated  with  such  a  subject.  Although  these  curriculum  principles  were  not  fully 
41 Government  of  Ghana  2003a,  pp.  13-14;  Government  of  Ghana  2003b;  Akumanyi  (2007)  report  for  the  National 
Commission for Civic Education (pp. 5-7).
42 The National Commission on Civic Education was established by the Government of Ghana with the aim of assisting the 
district assemblies educate their populations on their rights and responsibilities as Ghanaian Citizens.
43 The National Commission on Children is also involved–collaborating with other agencies such as the Ghana Education 
Service and the Ghana Health Service among others to ensure that projects for children are implemented. Its programmes 
include school enrolment drives, community sensitization, etc. CHRAJ also collaborates with the Ghana Education Service to 
undertake school educational programmes to discuss and create awareness on HIV/AIDS education. 
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embraced  in  the  new citizenship  education  reform,  they  do  reflect  the  desire  and  orientation  of 
Government towards ensuring that children and youth are educated with certain values. These values 
also suggest an understanding of the need to integrate concepts of unity with diversity within the 
Ghanaian curriculum. The goals include the inculcation amongst young Ghanaians of: citizenship with 
nationalism; knowledge and the love of God; nurturing sound and moral  character and behaviour; 
quality education for all; globalisation; respect for diversity; promotion of analytical, creative, critical 
and problem solving skills;  education relevance for  life;  nurturing commitment  among the  youth; 
holistic  education;  strengthening  of  multilingualism  in  schools;  environmental  awareness;  gender 
sensitivity; training for self employment; democracy; and lifelong learning (Akumanyi 2007). 
Following these recommendations, national educational goals for citizenship education were 
redefined in the Report of the President’s Committee on the Review of Educational Reforms in Ghana: 
Meeting the Challenges of Education in the 21st Century (October 2002) in the following ways: 
• To  promote  social  justice  and  equity  by  ensuring  universal  basic  education  and  equal 
educational opportunities for all Ghanaians;
• To  provide  individuals  with  knowledge,  occupational  skills  and  attitudes  and  national 
development with a sense of dignity for labour and for preserving the nation’s environmental 
resources;
• To promote the culture of lifelong learning for all citizens who will continue to develop their 
intellectual  capacities,  technical  skills  and  their  abilities  to  enable  them  to  cope  with 
technological and other changes in the global world;
• To promote the spirit of self-reliance that will enable individuals to be responsible for their 
well being as well as the community;
• To develop in the individual the ability to create, innovate, think critically and be independent 
minded;
• To strengthen national consciousness and cultivate attitudes of good citizenship and patriotism 
and through that help preserve the nation’s cultural heritage by promoting national languages 
and desirable traditions and values;
• To develop attitudes conducive to harmonious relations among different ethnic groups and the 
international community, (Government of Ghana, 2002, p. 5).
A  syllabus  for  citizenship  education  has  recently  been  developed  to  reflect  these  national 
recommendations44 and as part of the preparatory activities towards the implementation of the New 
Educational Reform.45 The Ministry of Education redefined what should be taught in Upper Primary 
44 Presidential Commission Report 2002.
45 The New Education Reform implemented by the previous government is the Government’s latest attempt to 
improve access, quality and management of Ghana’s entire education system. The main thrust of the reform is to 
make kindergarten education compulsory for all  Ghanaian children and to add one additional  year  onto the 
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level from P4 to P6 from September 2007. The general aims reflect a more active approach that young 
people would build attitudes and values that would help solve both personal and societal problems. 
The  focus  is  still  one  of  ensuring  national  unity,  a  national  consciousness  that  would  help  in 
developing the country. Young people would acquire the desired characteristics of a Ghanaian who 
was patriotic towards his/her country (MOE, 2007). However, this time, there was also an emphasis 
not just on attitudes or values, but on developing critical thinking skills. 
The content of this new citizenship curriculum encompasses civics, life skills, social studies, 
religious  and  moral  education  (MOE 2007)46 with  four  key sections  in  the  citizenship  education 
program, namely: authority: government, the constitution, the individual’s self-concept, interpersonal 
relationships  with  the  community,  and  finally,  responsibility  and  justice—a  syllabus  that  is  not 
dissimilar from most such curricula found in Northern contexts.47 
Evaluating the impact on Ghanaian youth
The  history  of  Ghana’s  attempt  to  educate  its  young  citizens  and  prepare  them  for  citizenship 
demonstrates  a  strong  commitment  to  frame  national  values  and  address  international  pressures 
particularly those around human rights and economic development. The emphasis on national unity is 
strong both in the early agenda of Nkrumah’s education for all campaign, and more recently in relation 
to  the  Millennium Development  Goals.  National  unity  in  a  post  colonial  framework  has  meant, 
according  to  Sefa  Dei  (2005a),  the  binding  together  of  the  younger  generation  into  a  national 
consciousness which could ensure stability and unity. There are conflicting views about whether this 
agenda for the education of young Ghanaians has been successful in reducing social marginalisation. 
Levstik and Groth’s (2005) study48 on 150 Ghanaian secondary school students in four junior 
secondary schools  suggests  that  official  and ethnic histories have managed to merge—the former 
including the latter. The national history which emerges tells a ‘story of subjugation, struggle and 
sacrifice’ which does appear to establish a need for national unity and the value of diversity. Whilst 
nation  building,  democratisation  and  participatory  citizenship  are  embedded  in  the  social  studies 
curriculum in Ghana, it does include rather than exclude vernacular histories.  Diversity is seen as a 
strength, a building block for the creation of a national narrative in a way that would not be as present 
senior secondary school system. This has been reversed back to three years by the incumbent government The 
Government also intends to reduce the number of years for an undergraduate degree from four years to three 
years. There is also a stronger emphasis on vocational and technical education. 
46 The new curriculum makes citizenship education in Ghana a compulsory subject at the upper primary level 
(P4-P6), i.e. the formative years, where attributes and values should be inculcated into children. At the lower 
primary level, environmental studies, aspects of social studies, life skills, hygiene (health sciences), religious and 
moral education have been integrated.
47 Other agencies outside government schools also engage in civic education. One of the few NGOs working in this area in 
Ghana is CIVITAS. CIVITAS (2002) has formulated a training manual called the “Street Law: Everyday law”. This NGO 
undertakes civic education and educates operators in the informal sector such as fitters, carpenters, masons, informal settler 
groups, etc on civic responsibilities. The CIVITAS motto is to catch the younger generation in terms of civic education. It 
organizes training programmes for teachers, who then acquire knowledge and/or skills to teach with. It has reached more than 
500 teachers. Currently it is training 100 teachers constituted by 10 teachers per region. 
48 A study of 150 junior secondary students and their relationship to ethnic and national history. 
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in Kenyan education,  especially since social  education and ethics have been made optional  in the 
secondary school. There is a strong commitment to honour multiple identities and search for unifying 
elements, but it does not create critical analysis of that history, unity, diversity or model democratic 
forms  of  citizenship  participation  (ibid.,  p.  582).  This  sort  of  research  is  invaluable  in  exploring 
concepts of democracy and citizenship (like that in Kenya and South Africa)—it taps the ways in 
which young people (adolescents) ‘make sense of their relationship to their nation in the context of 
their colonial and postcolonial history’ (p. 565). Their teachers on the other hand, worry that youth 
appear to be adopting European culture, even preferring it. 
However, according to Sefa Dei (2005a), his in-depth research suggests that the school system 
has been unable to develop a sense of heterogeneity in local populations since ‘difference’ is still 
viewed  as  a  problem.  Sefa  Dei  argues  that  the  process  of  creating  a  national  identity  based  on 
sameness led to silencing difference in ways that maintained Ghana’s colonial heritage: 
(I)t  is  this silencing that  has turned the politics of  shared identity into a colonial and 
colonising  practice.  A  colonised  discourse  of  the  Ghanaian  identity  can  best  be 
characterised as unity oblivious to difference, that is, unity defined strictly in sameness. 
However, it is important to reiterate that what is problematic is not the mere affirmation 
of unity per se but the negation of the differences that connect our individual identities to 
a shared national identity' (Sefa Dei, 2005a, p.282). 
The desire to create a common citizen in the spirit of nation building means that attention to difference 
is  seen  as  ‘dangerous,  fostering  conflict  and  division’  (p.  482).  The  history  of  education  post 
independence,  appears  to  offer  an  inclusive  citizenship  to  youth,  not  least  in  an  entitlement  to 
education, and in participating in the national project, and in the notion of a shared identity which 
connects people to a shared history. Sefa Dei and Opinini’s (2007) longitudinal study of diversity and 
difference  in  Ghanaian  Schools  in  the  late  1990’s  indicates  that  ‘many  students  continue  to  be 
marginalized and disenfranchised, at least in terms of the failure (of schools) to work with their lived 
experiences and social realities in everyday schooling practise’ (p. 481). If students feel alienated and 
cannot see their worldview or culture represented within the schooling experience, it is unlikely that 
there will be equality in educational outcomes. The study reveals that the current schooling experience 
for  diverse  groups of  Ghanaians  is  reproducing intergenerational  inequalities  particularly those of 
social class, economic background and gender (Sefa Dei and Opini: 2007).
In order for the citizenry to be empowered to realise their full potential, new thinking within 
the education system would be needed to acknowledge and challenge diversity instead of stifling the 
recognition of it in the face of post independence goals to unite: ‘Disturbingly, education reforms in 
Ghana have failed to address critically questions of difference in relation to consideration of class, 
gender, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences’ (Sefa Dei, 2005b, p. 270). Sefa Dei argues 
that the Ghanaian identity is demarcated by these differences with the Ghanaian identity involving a 
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multi -ethnic dimension at the same time that it shares a common sense of belonging to a community: 
‘To acknowledge and respond to such ethnic differences actually strengthens and affirms (rather than 
detracts) from a mutual sense of belonging to a nation’ (ibid, p. 278). An inclusive education (which is 
essential  for  national  development)  arguably is  one  which ‘responds to  the  concerns,  aspirations, 
knowledge,  creativity,  and  resourcefulness  of  local  peoples…’  (ibid.,  p.268).  As  far  as  the 
development of the focus of the Ghanaian school curriculum is concerned: ‘In adopting the colonising 
dividing practices of western knowledge production that divides student bodies and communities into 
'good' and 'bad' Ghanaians through the denunciation of difference, the growth of the African centred 
anti-colonial  consciousness  is  severely jeopardised’  (ibid.,  p.283).  Sefa  Dei  argued that,  although 
prominent post colonial thinkers such as Nkrumah and Busia attempted to shape the education system 
and to rebuild the Ghanaian mind, spirit and state…unfortunately, when the strategic goal of nation 
building was attempted but did not include the decolonisation of the mind, and the integration of the 
many facets of Ghanaian identity particularly among the youth.
Curricula transformation therefore is not necessarily enough when embedded within a ‘post 
colonial  framework  of  education’.  Clignet  and  Foster  (1971)  suggested  that  British  policy in  the 
colonial Ghana led to a degree of flexibility in the development of an essentially low-cost education, a 
flexibility that was manifest in the diffusion of missionary schooling following the space and scope 
granted  to  them.  Educational  developments  in  Ghana  continued  to  be  directed  by  such  'colonial 
precedents’ but also ‘public demand and expectations which are to a large measure, a response to the 
changing characteristics of the occupational structures of both Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire' (Clignet and 
Foster,  1971,  p.  269).  Steiner-Khamsi  & Quist  (2000)  supported this  line  of  criticism when they 
argued that  secondary schools  in  Ghana  and  Cote  d’Ivoire  are  still  patterned  on  typical  Western 
education models that are British and French, and in recent times, American in nature. This shows in 
their bias towards academic literacy rather than technical or vocational education. 
Commentators on Ghana’s educational system have also been concerned about the current 
ideological framing of Ghanaian education by international agencies. Pryor (1998), for example, saw 
the influence of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund on less developed countries such as 
Ghana, which were also caught up in the discourse of neo-liberal economics (Watkins, 2000). Implicit 
in the education of citizens through mass schooling was not the democratising of the country,  but 
rather the rolling back of the boundaries of the state and the ‘voluntarising’ society has become the 
new imperative (Pryor, 1998, p.70). Wilson’s (1999) student of 162 Ghanaian teachers found that they 
were proud of their culture, its hospitality, leadership in gaining independence in Africa, peacekeeping 
globally and their rich traditional cultures. However they worried that in an increasingly independent 
world, the things they value were at risk. European cultures seem to have taken over. They themselves 
enriched their teaching with international ideas and travel experiences, but they were challenged to 
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find  ‘Ghanaian  solutions’  to  the  problems  that  the  country  faced  as  a  result  of  such  global 
interdependence. 
Quist (2001)’s put the debate into perspective, arguing that the lack of recognition of Africa’s 
triple heritage of diverse language,  religion and ethnic identity has prevented African youth  from 
developing a sense of belonging, a commitment to serve and contributing as citizens to their nation. 
British cultural practices of the colonial era have had a profound influence in direct, indirect, overt and 
covert ways that influence the cultural practices, life-styles and attitudes of students in present day 
Ghana. The consequences of not finding a solution to link Ghanaian language, culture and traditions to 
contemporary demands has translated itself into psychological conflict  for youth about whether to 
accept or reject in relation to accepting or rejecting their indigenous culture and values in favour of 
Western values. 
Today,  secondary school  students  in  both Ghana and Cote  D’Ivoire  find themselves  torn 
between  learning  and  mastering  their  own  languages  rather  than  English  or  French  languages; 
accepting  and  appreciating  indigenous  values,  traditions  and  customs  as  against  internalising  and 
assimilating Western counterparts; appreciating national and indigenous music, local drama and the 
arts  and  traditional  forms  of  dressing  as  against  Western  music,  forms  of  dressing  and  the  arts; 
watching Western films, reading novels by Western writers in contrast to those by their own writers’’ 
(Quist, 2001, p. 308). 
Out of the 200 secondary students Quist interviewed in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire all preferred 
to be instructed in the English or French language and only 35% of the Ghanaian students interviewed 
could  speak  their  native  language.  Students  in  both  countries  also  agreed  that  much  of  their 
instructional practice and learning had favoured Western patterns and approaches. 
The responses from these students point to a case of cultural alienation. However, the roots of 
such  alienation  can  be  traced  to  the  colonial  era.  The  consequences  of  these  experiences  are 
psychological  conflict  between  accepting  indigenous  as  against  Western  Culture,  lack  of  interest 
among  many  secondary  school  students  in  their  own  traditions  and  customs,  a  development 
surprisingly encouraged by some of their educated parents; an inability to speak their own languages 
as fluently as they speak English or French; a greater tendency and preference for Western ways of 
dressing, mannerisms, culture, arts, films and dances. The overall effect has been the undermining of 
the postcolonial project and cultural perspectives of nation building (Quist, 2001, p.310). 
Paradoxically, the prominent outcomes of education in Ghana is the fact that secondary school 
students  imbibe  Western/international  cultural  characteristics,  mannerisms  and  attitudes  that 
undermine  the  promotion,  development  and  sustenance  of  African  cultures  and  traditions49 and 
49 Cultures in this context (that is, African cultures) refer to ''the inclusivity of life evolved by African peoples in 
their attempts to fashion a harmonious co-existence between themselves and the environment, a totality of life 
which gives order, meaning and pleasure to social, political, economic, aesthetic and religious norms'' (Sefa Dei, 
1994, p. 5).
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contributed to creating and sustaining an educated elite more in tune with international cultures than 
their own. In some cases there is such an aversion to Ghanaian culture and language that young middle 
class youth will only consider studying a Ghanaian language if it is an additional school subject. Such 
Western patterns of secondary education may have exposed young people to ideas about nationalism 
(Quist, 2001, p. 306), human rights (Appiah and McMahon, 2002; Quist, 2001, p. 306), and to some 
understanding of the nature of European societies as well as the combination of Western and African 
ideas about indigenous needs and abilities (Quist, 2001, p. 306). In this context, it is not surprising that 
the Ghanaian government is currently reemphasising Ghanaian culture. 
Contemporary discussions about democracy in Ghana focus on how students should fit into 
society, and become decision makers along similar lines to those indicated by the concept of youth 
citizenship in the World Bank’s World Development Report 2007. However, the type of democratic 
citizen being proposed is still not likely to experience democracy in the education system. Although as 
we have seen,  Ghana endorsed the Convention on the Rights of  the  Child (UN 1989) it  has not 
according to Agu (2000) used this to create a ‘child friendly system of education’ recognising rights 
and responsibilities.  There  is  little  opportunity to hear children’s  voice’.  Pryor  et  al,  (2005) have 
pointed  out  that  school  councils  in  Ghana,  which  should  provide  a  context  where  democracy as 
portrayed by the social studies syllabus can be learnt, ‘are not perceived by principals, teachers, pupils 
as a contribution and preparation for democratic citizenship’ (ibid. p77). Another sign of the lack of 
children’s  voice  within  the  Ghanaian  school  system is  the  high  level  of  abuse,  both  verbal  and 
physical,  experienced  by  children  particularly  girls  in  school  across  Ghana  (Leach  et  al,  2003). 
Research by UNICEF (2008) also indicates that over 83.5% of Ghanaian children experience some 
form of psychological punishment. Out of the survey, 89.2% of children across Ghana between the 
ages  of  2  and  14  experienced  some  form of  psychological  or  physical  punishment  by  mothers, 
caregivers or other household members.
In contrast, educated Ghanaians have been observed to have a higher degree of social rights 
(Peil, 1995), economic rights (Lentz, 2006), and political rights (Peil, 1995; Lentz, 2006) than those 
who have not had an education. Peil’s (1995) case study of a suburban community in Accra, Ghana 
found that having an education enabled people to understand better their social context and the polity. 
For instance, apart from protecting people from being cheated, ‘it makes people aware of their rights; 
people are able to move freely without any inferiority complex; educated people are more enlightened 
and can participate better in social life; it enables people to fit into society’ (p. 301). 
Despite the comprehensiveness of Ghanaian goals for the educational system and curriculum, 
interviews50 with key government officials at the MOE and NCCE suggest that the education system 
still has a long way to go in instilling civic and moral values and attitudes. For example, as one senior 
officer at the Curriculum Research and Development Division of the Ministry of Education, Science 
50 Interviews  were  conducted  in  July,  2007 with  various  Government  agencies  and  institutions  involved  in 
citizenship education including the Curriculum Research and Development Division of the MOE and NCCE. 
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and Sports stated, ‘although citizenship is embedded in a broad range of curriculum subjects it (i.e. the 
MOESS) still felt it important to have a subject on citizenship as part of the education curriculum in 
schools  to  feel  part  of  the  society and  country at  large…’ Despite  government’s  commitment  to 
developing young people’s capabilities in relation to civic duties and responsibilities, she argued: 
Collective responsibility is lacking in Ghana, thus the nation needs massive attitudinal change 
and if everybody can make the effort, the nation would become a better place for existence … 
the lack of time on the part of parents has contributed immensely to the moral degeneration in 
the country.  (Interview with Senior Officer Curriculum Research Division, MOE, 4th July 
2007).
There is  growing evidence that  crime  and promiscuity among the youth  is  on the  rise in 
Ghana. Recent articles suggest that Ghana is one of the world’s major transit arenas for the trafficking 
of cocaine and other narcotic drugs to Europe. Several media reports have suggested that youth crime 
is on the increase and youth are the main perpetrators of crime. According to the YWCA Ghana Youth 
Watch over 70% of crime in Ghana is committed by youth. High rates of unemployment among youth 
and lack of opportunity are some of the reasons for this high rate (www.ywca.org/world/ghana). There 
is also concern about ‘moral degeneration’ in Ghana which is assumed to have been precipitated to 
some extent by parents unable to devote time to their children and decline in attention/ neglect of their 
role as parents in the lives of their children. There is concern about generational gaps in the teaching 
of values, and the neglect of parental responsibilities in terms of creating moral and orderly citizens 
among educationalists in Ghana.
Although the relationship of the individual to the state increasingly has been defined through 
instrumental economic rationales relating to particular models of economic development. much more 
research is needed to measure the impact of both formal state schooling on youth citizenship in Ghana, 
and of citizenship education as a curriculum subject  on the formation of their  identities.  There is 
clearly a need to understand the competing goals of education and how these translate into equalising 
or  creating  destabilising  environments  for  national  development,  poverty  reduction  and  wealth 
creation. 
RECONCEPTUALISING TRANSITIONS TO CITIZENSHIP 
No one is born a good citizen: no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that 
continue to evolve over a life time. Young people must be included from birth. A society that 
cuts off from its youth severs its lifeline 
(Kofi Annan quoted in WDR 2007, footnote 124 p. 183)
As  we  have  seen,  nation–building,  national  growth  and  the  education  of  the  citizen  are  closely 
interconnected. Citizenship as an outcome of education is now recognised as meaningful within the 
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context of nation building (Avoseh, 2001). The ‘nation’ in this context aims to be ‘mostly inclusive 
with a set of values, institutions and other self-conscious cultural entities for the development of its 
members’ (p.480). The very concept of nationhood ‘requires the active participation of all citizens that 
goes beyond the passive level to include full  and active participation’ (ibid) in religious, political, 
social, economic, cultural and educational aspects of the community that is, the national community.
In  terms  of  African  socialism,  Avoseh  argues  that  ‘in  African  traditional  thought,  active 
citizenship for nation building requires that the individual’s activities must simultaneously promote 
the corporate existence of the community. This puts humanity at the centre of nation building or active 
citizenship’ (Avoseh, 2001, p.480). Similarly, political participation within African nations requires 
‘the citizen to be a part of the democratic process…though the political system is guaranteed through a 
consensus, where everybody meets at the market place or village square to participate in the decision 
making process’ (ibid). Economically active citizenship is pivoted on hard work which may be viewed 
as  the  gateway  to  success  and/or  greatness  as  well  as  an  antidote  for  curing  poverty  and/or 
underdevelopment (ibid). 
The relationship between culture and citizenship in Africa is also centred around the basic 
elements of obligations to the community and interpersonal relationships. Such relationship as Avoseh 
(2001) asserts are ‘sensitive to values such as the sacredness of human life, mutual help, generosity, 
cooperation,  respect  for  older people,  harmony and the preservation of  the  sacred’ (p.  483).  This 
concept  of  citizenship  has  been  situated  within  the  extended  family  and  community  at  large. 
Individuals are able to develop the concept of self and the notion of community through the process of 
informal education and training. In contrast, Avoseh (2001) argues that 
(T)he active citizen from our contemporary understanding of globalisation is one who acquires 
more  power—especially  economic  and  political,  including  the  ability  for  coercive  force. 
[Also]…  the  emphasis  on  economic  power  in  the  larger  society  reflects  in  the  learning 
environment where the acquisitions of certificates are more important than the acquisition of 
knowledge and skills for personal and community benefit (Avoseh, 2001, p.485).51 
This tension between the demands of global capitalism and African development has been illustrated 
in this paper in a variety of ways. On the one hand, the World Bank’s agenda aims to ensure that 
‘every young person should come into contact with a venue for inclusion, solidarity, and participation 
(WDR 2007, p. 183). This democratisation of education, however, has been lodged within the new 
discursive  framings  of  human  capital,  linking  citizenship,  human  rights,  poverty alleviation,  with 
national economic growth. The World Bank is aware of the importance of investing in democratisation 
although it admits the connection to poverty alleviation is never that simple. Arguably democracy can 
have no effect on growth especially after the positive effects of initial democratisation of a country’s 
51 This  phenomenon  has  been  very  explicitly  exemplified  by  the  Kivukoni  College  in  Tanzania  and  the 
Awudome Residential College in Ghana.
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governance have worn off. On the other hand, democratisation by ‘reducing corruption, improving 
governance, increasing demand for human capital investment, preparing for disaster and preventing 
disasters’ might yet ‘enhance development outcomes’ (World Bank, 2007). 
The tensions between Western and non-Western understandings of citizenship are at the heart of 
the debate (Bhola 2002) especially if Western values entail the promotion of market driven economies 
which lose touch with social values and the social outcomes intended for schooling. Initially as Jordan 
(2006) points out, 
(I)n post war welfare states the (political culture of education) was aimed at preparing 
pupils for equal citizenship, cooperation and a democratic form of membership. In that 
period, the public value of education was political as well  as economic.  It  socialised 
children  and  young  people  for  their  roles  as  citizens  and  made  them  loyal  to  the 
institutions  of  the  country.  Any  Government  included  this  political  value  in  its 
calculations of the balance between social and private benefits (Jordan, 2006, p. 116) 
This liberal imperative to educate the next generation for democratic purposes through citizenship 
education courses was one supported by the Colonial Office in the late 1940s (Colonial Office, 1948, 
p.13). It argued that true democracy revolves around a system of political and economic machinery as 
well as a certain habit or frame of mind amongst those who controlled the machinery of government. 
As a citizen needs to be self-less enough to desire that others have what they need, everybody makes 
the biggest contribution possible on his/her part for purposes of the common welfare. Ironically, the 
British colonial government in Africa recognised the outcomes of education needed to integrate the 
notion of national identity and citizenship with a sense of belonging. A Colonial Government paper on 
‘Education for Citizenship in Africa’ stated that the effective practice of citizenship cannot be limited 
to special education for citizenship but should be part of the overall education of the child. One of the 
effects of schooling/education was meant to draw parents of youth to the government and the related 
agencies of progress.52 
A democratic person needs to be armed with knowledge and wisdom, liberal portions of 
the  truest  form  of  wisdom.  Citizenship  carries  with  it  duties  and  rights,  e.g.  being 
respected  and  respecting  fellow  men  [sic]  in  return.  Other  issues  associated  with 
citizenship and democracy include being well-informed about issues of foreign affairs, 
economic and other issues related to government; have the gift of straight thinking; be 
able to keep first things first; being loyal, etc.” (Colonial Office, 1948, p.16). 
Education for citizenship within this colonialist welfare tradition was expected to ‘take the lead over 
political  and economic  development  and having once taken the  lead should be careful  to keep it 
(Colonial Office, 1948 p.16).
52 However, even at that point, it was clear that schooling had led to educated youth migrating to Europe and 
supposedly better off countries for purposes of '’seeking greener pastures,’ employment, and the natural desire 
for urban amenities (Colonial Office, 1948).  
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The reorientation of education as simply a private good without equal emphasis of its potential 
social good in the latter half of the twentieth century in Western Europe has resulted in a different 
highly individualised model of citizenship for young people. In Jordan’s (2006, p.117) view: 
In the new model of education urged by the World Bank, WTO and the large education 
companies,  this  culture  (the  social  good)  is  seen  as  a  cost,  not  a  benefit. 
Commercialisation  and  the  ‘choice  of  agenda’  in  education  encourage  parents  and 
students to seek private value without regard for the consequences to other citizens or for 
the institution of which they are members … They erode loyalty and interdependence, 
encouraging autonomy and competition rather than sharing. This may damage the very 
public culture on which democracy and citizenship rely. (Jordan, 2006, p. 117)
The path taken by African countries such as Ghana and Kenya reflects the duality of citizenship—that 
Mamdami (1996) described—that is located, on the one hand, in the relationship of the individual to 
the state (liberal democratic citizenship) and, on the other, in a relationship to the power relations and 
forms of authority found within local ethnic communities.  The latter as we recognised above is a 
major source of identity, rights, responsibility, authority, legitimacy and agency although this form of 
citizenship  does  not  appear  to  have  shaped  the  form  of  citizenship  education  provided  by  the 
governments of Ghana and Kenya. 
In post-colonial states such as Kenya and Ghana, Ndegwa (1997; 1998) argues, the tension 
between these two goals of democracy and market capitalism makes it hard for planning the task of 
the educational system.53 A major concern is whether such political liberalisation has created rather 
than reduced social tensions, especially in relation to the education of young people (Ndegwa 1998). 
Although political rights have expanded (as we have seen), social and economic rights in countries 
such as Kenya and Ghana have contracted and the support of the individual (for example through 
employment, health care) by the state arguably may even decrease. Neo-liberal reforms are associated 
with a withdrawal of rights and entitlements and increasing social inequality and a rolling back of the 
state. Opposition to the state in this context increased (note the teachers’ strike in Kenya in 1997 and 
post election conflict in 2007). Young peoples’ identity politics may be more framed by opposition as 
a sense of belonging to national traditions and duties. 
African nations such as the two countries we have studied are increasingly aware that market 
theories alone will not empower their citizenry, reduce poverty or help build a human resource base 
willing  to  engage  and  develop  their  nations.  There  is  increasing  interest  in  tapping  the  political 
identities and values of young people as a result of their schooling and community identifications (see 
for example, Preece and Mosweunyane (2004), Kendall, (2007), Hunt (2007), Abdi, Ellis and Shizha 
(2005),  Carter,  Harber and Serf  (2003), Unterhalter (2000) Burgess,  (2005a and b).  These studies 
53 The  triple  cultural  heritages  of  such  countries  around  African,  Euro-Christian  and  Islamic  education 
complicates even further (c.f. H. O. Quist (2001). 
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suggest the importance of exploring the impact and outcomes of schooling in terms of a broad range of 
citizenship roles, rights and responsibilities, in terms of the young people’s negotiation of marketising 
principles and neo-liberal values, and in terms of traditional values and cultures, and in terms of the 
power of schooling to help young people participate actively in society. 
There is some evidence that  traditional  and modern leaders are beginning to invest in the 
social returns to education and recognizing that these may have untold economic returns if they make 
education  a  more  empowering  force  within  society.  Korboe  (1998),  however,  reminds  us  of  the 
divergences between the priorities of chiefs and other community leaders and the common citizenry on 
the other. Communities experiencing hardship were found to have a range of visions around notions of 
human security and social affiliation strategies to cope with their powerlessness. Defining the social 
outcomes of schooling would need to consider a wide range of notions of well being, vulnerability and 
exclusion that go beyond the technical, the economic and the political. 
Youth citizenship is a new international discourse which also has to be addressed critically if 
it is to be of value to those disadvantaged by the economic structures which their citizenship practice 
is now meant to help function effectively. As Sefa Dei (2005:267) points out, post colonial education 
in Africa, despite its commitments to ‘inclusivity and nation building’ largely fails to engage with the 
glaring disparities and inequities structured along lines of ethnicity, culture, language, religion, gender 
and class, which persist and grow.
The emphasis on the relationship between youth and citizenship clearly raises questions, as we 
have seen,  about  how society prepares young people for  citizenship.  It  encourages us to consider 
inclusionary  practices  within  the  distribution  of  education,  the  shaping  and  ethos  of  schools  as 
institutions as well as the forms of citizenship education within the curriculum. The theme throws the 
spotlight  on  the  political  and  social  exclusion  of  the  youth.  Young people  who  cannot  invest  in 
schooling are distanced from the state project of education for all, egalitarian agendas, and market 
economies. In that sense they are non-citizens (Benhabib 2004), ‘out of place’ outside the boundaries 
of  citizenship,  not  just  ‘out  of  school’.  Such  youth  are  likely  to  be  especially  disadvantaged, 
marginalised and vulnerable. Their poverty is particularly acute because often they are without adult 
support structures to help them out of desperate straights. Often times, governments pathologise and 
demonise them who tend to be associated with the ‘problems’ of the social order and problematise 
them as potential criminals. Youth and youth citizenship are clearly now on the agenda both from the 
point of view of those wishing to promote the expansion of a globalised free market, but also those 
who are keen to reduce the social exclusion of young people facing poverty. In this context, the young 
people’s experiences of shifts in generational cultures, traditional patriarchies and family structures, 
transforming  economies  and  increasing  inequalities  between  rich  and  poor,  are  recognised  as 
important,  even vitally important,  if  the  possibility of  social  stability,  democratic  governance and 
48
national  growth  is  to  be  realised.  Young  people,  particularly  marginalised  youth,  have  had  ‘an 
unpromising political role’ up until now in nation building (O’Brien 1996). 
The breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty means starting with the social and 
political expectations of African youth and their ability to achieve a sense of belonging and identity, a 
range  of  civic  capabilities  and  political  agency  in  the  community,  the  national  and  the  global 
structures. Young people in poverty,  by definition, wait outside the gates of citizenship. Much has 
been attempted in the name of creating new nations, democratic governance, social ethics that can 
deliver collective responsibility as well as the development of individual potential.  The window of 
opportunity to include young people is now. 
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